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There's a way to fairly reliably mark messages as insecure when they're sent by clients that don't verify certs. For every incoming ssl smtps connection, googl
by harshreality 11y ago
There's a way to fairly reliably mark messages as insecure when they're sent by clients that don't verify certs.
For every incoming ssl smtps connection, google could forge a cert the first time it encounters a connection from a particular ip on a particular day. If the client continues with the ssl negotiation, google would know to mark the message as unsecure, because the sender isn't verifying certs.
You could obviously adjust the frequency with which the recipient (eg google) tests each IP. It wouldn't have to be every 24 hours. You could also use additional heuristics to re-test, even going so far as to disconnect immediately and force the client to retry (giving it a forged cert test) if you trust the client ip but see a different helo than you saw last time. You could even use global bgp feed to invalidate any successful tests from a netblock when there's a visible routing change for it.
- agwa 11y agoIf Gmail did this, the MitM would be sure to correctly validate Gmail's certs.
- tedunangst 11y agoIntroducing spurious failures to improve security feels like one of those ideas likely to have unintended consequences.
- cortesoft 11y agoWhat would stop the MiTM from verifying Gmail's cert? Say, the email is sent in plain text, it is intercepted by the bad guy, then the bad guy sends it on to gmail encrypted, with cert checking and everything. I am failing to see what your proposal would help.