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An interesting case would be something like hash flooding prevention. The cost of a full CSPRNG is probably not worth it--no security is broken if we lose the s
by ahh 11y ago
An interesting case would be something like hash flooding prevention. The cost of a full CSPRNG is probably not worth it--no security is broken if we lose the secrecy of one generated seed--but at the same time we want something that is at least nontrivial for an attacker to predict.
I agree that most cases you either don't care at all or need a real CSPRNG.
- tedunangst 11y agoPreventing hash flooding requires a single 128 bit seed per table. How expensive is it to generate that with a real CSPRNG?
- ahh 11y agoDepends how many hash tables you have! :) I agree that it's a marginal gain here, but Thomas asked for a case where predictability of "more difficult than a LCG or Mersenne Twister, but not infeasible under crypto assumptions" would have value. This would be an example.