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The article clarifies the issues that exist with SMTP encryption nicely. Regarding the issue with certificates for the servers that the MX points to, I disagre
by Tepix 11y ago
The article clarifies the issues that exist with SMTP encryption nicely.
Regarding the issue with certificates for the servers that the MX points to, I disagree with the author.
If the MX for example.com points to mail.example.info, it implies that example.com trusting the handling of its mail to mail.example.info, therefore there is no issue with letting mail.example.info present its own certificate.
The article also suggests that DNSSEC with DANE will solve all issues with SMTP encryption.
However, DNSSEC is a crappy standard. It doesn't do encryption so a surveillant can still collect metadata; it has unsolved issues that facilitate amplification attacks, it's overly complex and has slow adoption.
In fact, before DANE arrived on the scene, there was hardly a good reason to deploy it.
If we adopt DNSSEC now we'll be stuck with it (including its lack of privacy) pretty much forever. Instead, I suggest we work on more promising initiatives such as DNSCurve (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCurve https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCurve)
- FiloSottile 11y agoThanks! Not sure I made that point clearly but I'm not saying that performing validation against the MX target is wrong. However it requires the MX to be authenticated (i.e. signed with DNSSEC), otherwise the attacker can just falsify the MX and have mail delivered to a server for which it has a valid certificate, making validation useless.
- jcrites 11y agoSome additional arguments against DNSSEC and a FAQ from Thomas Ptacek: http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ http://sockpuppet.org/stuff/dnssec-qa.html http://sockpuppet.org/stuff/dnssec-qa.html I was not familiar with that EFF project. Looks like an interesting starting point. I wonder if, rather than maintaining a central configuration file, domain owners could vend configuration through canonical URLs on each domain, like https://example.com/.smtp-ssl https://example.com/.smtp-ssl for example.com - essentially bootstrap the security through another protocol that's more mature. (This could have the effect of using the existing CA system rather than relying on a government-controlled PKI.)
- Bino 11y agoMTA's are beginning to support DANE, now let's wait for some larger companies (google, yahoo, office365) to jump on the bandwagon to publish TLSA records... http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_dane http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_dane https://github.com/Exim/exim/blob/master/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog#L234 https://github.com/Exim/exim/blob/master/doc/doc-txt/ChangeL... http://wiki.halon.io/DANE http://wiki.halon.io/DANE
- talideon 11y ago> However, DNSSEC is a crappy standard. It doesn't do encryption so a surveillant can still collect metadata; To be fair, on-the-wire encryption is a problem orthogonal to that which DNSSEC is attempting to solve, which is integrity. > it has unsolved issues that facilitate amplification attacks, it's overly complex and has slow adoption. In fact, before DANE arrived on the scene, there was hardly a good reason to deploy it. Yup, DANE is essentially its killer app. Any chance you could outline how you think it could be improved? > If we adopt DNSSEC now we'll be stuck with it (including its lack of privacy) pretty much forever. Instead, I suggest we work on more promising initiatives such as DNSCurve (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCurve https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCurve) I don't think the case. As I wrote, DNSSEC aims to solve the issue of integrity, not privacy. DNSCurve, or something like it, should be deployed alongside DNSSEC, with the former giving you privacy, and the latter ensuring the integrity of the records. That way, even if the authoritative DNS server itself is compromised, you can know whether the data you're getting from it are OK or not. After all, it doesn't matter how good the pipe is if you're getting sludge rather than the clean water you expect through it. The big problem is that people, whether they're DNSSEC or DNSCurve advocates, incorrectly put DNSSEC and DNSCurve in competition with each other, but this isn't even remotely the case. We ought to be using both.
- Tepix 11y agoDNSCurve also provides integrity. It cryptographically authenticates all DNS responses. With DNSSEC yes, you can store signed data on a server without having to store the key on the same machine. It does make it even more complicated, however. With HTTPS, IMAPS, SMTPS etc we're also fine with storing the key on the server, why not with DNS? If you're worried about the key being stolen you can always store it in a HSM to limit the damage of a server compromise.
- gwu78 11y ago"In fact, before DANE arrived on the scene, there was hardly a good reason to deploy it [DNSSEC]." As I recall, the problem DNSSEC aimed to solve when it was re-proposed (it failed mutiple times previously), circa 2008, was cache poisoning. That problem can be solved other ways besides using DNSSEC under the control of third parties. Of course, today we rarely hear much about cache poisoning when DNSSEC is brought up. Instead the discussion usually revolves around other problems such as the CA system or spam. What's funny about this is that the proposed use of DNSSEC only enforces another system where potentially untrustworthy third parties are in control. Is it a coincidence this blog post was written by someone employed by Cloudflare? Another company tied to the DNS "business". This is the third post pushing DNSSEC from Cloudflare to reach the HN front page in the last month. Will there be a fourth?