5 ms·
you can do exactly the same things to check DANE-validated connections as you can for tradition ca validated ones. So on that front its as least as good as the
by throwaway2048 11y ago
you can do exactly the same things to check DANE-validated connections as you can for tradition ca validated ones. So on that front its as least as good as the CA model. The real advantages of dnssec+dane are:
Your single registrar becomes your ca (who you already have to trust isnt hijacking your domain and issuing certs for it), not (potentially) every ca on earth.
You can validate dns responses to be at least as real as the root dns servers claim.
Nonpinned certs gain a lot better gaurentees against random CAs. (google cant pin every cert in chrome)
It does not solve the problem of "what if the dns roots are lying to you", but as ca world cert aquisition is tied to that very same issue, neither does normal TLS.
- tptacek 11y agoI'm lost in your argument. Help me understand: if I'm reliant on key pinning and cert transparency, which exists for TLS CAs but not for DNSSEC, what exactly is DNSSEC doing for me? Why is it interesting that I only depend on one untrustworthy (and irrevocable) CA?
- throwaway2048 11y agobecause its impossible to pin everyone and everything everywhere. No matter what you are stuck trusting that dns roots arn't being evil in the case of unpinned cert. At least with DNSSEC you arnt stuck additionally trusting every CA on earth in the case an attacker can mitm, but dosent control said tld.
- tptacek 11y agoThe one CA on Earth DNSSEC asks most Internet users to trust is controlled by the f^cking NSA. How is this progress?
- throwaway2048 11y agobecause i would rather have to deal with the NSA, than everyone else + the NSA. The level of tampering required for the NSA to fake DNSSEC replies is very evident if you have the cert pinned, and very hard to deny. As things stand, its very easy to deny it was the NSA when anyone and their dog can have access to a CA cert.
- xorcist 11y agoYou might not want to carry that argument any further, since Verisign, which I presume you mean, is the single biggest CA today. They can sign anything. They can not, however, subvert the root zone any more. Not since it was singed in 2010.
- tptacek 11y agoDNSSEC advocates fetishize the security of the root zone, but are conspicuously silent about the trustworthiness of the DNS domains that really matter: .COM, &c.
- jessaustin 11y agoThis is just one reason why I'd love to see the creation of many thousands more TLDs. The importance of ".com" was always a temporarily contrived contingent condition, a false scarcity perpetuated in the seeking of rent. The sooner that's over the better. (Expecting users to read URIs was always a losing tactic, but surely everyone knows that now with IDNs.)
- xorcist 11y agoSince you replied to my comment, I just want to point out that I am not an "advocate" for DNSSEC, neither do I "fetishize" the security of anything. What I do is to point out that with today's domain validated model, it would make a lot more sense to restrict the validation path to only includes authoritative information about the domain, and to do so in a way that is cryptographically secure. The fact here is that Verisign can sign anything, today. They can not, however, impact the validation chain that DANE provides. There are also many millions of use cases where .com does not matter at all.
- tptacek 11y agoIf they control the keys for .COM, they absolutely can do that. Name an important domain, and let's see what world government controls its DNSSEC keys.