5 ms·

The problem of "asshole controls the TLD" is not solvable via ANY protocol. That dosen't mean DNSSEC is worthless, or handing over the keys of the internet to t

by throwaway2048 11y ago

The problem of "asshole controls the TLD" is not solvable via ANY protocol. That dosen't mean DNSSEC is worthless, or handing over the keys of the internet to the government or miscellaneous hyperventilating. You are falling into the classic trap of "this dosent solve every problem so we cannot permit it to solve any problem" that has held back security for decades. DNSSEC is real, it is deployable and stuff is capable of supporting it, and it does solve very real issues. That counts.

tptacek 11y ago
Sorry, that's simply not true. Assholes control TLDs today, and they do not get to easily bypass Gmail TLS. My point is, of course, that DNSSEC creates more serious problems than it solves. If you think my argument is "DNSSEC isn't perfect and we should wait for perfection", you haven't read what I'm saying carefully enough.
- xorcist 11y ago
  > Assholes control TLDs today, and they do not get to easily bypass Gmail TLS. They absolutely do, which is why we have things like key pinning.
  - tptacek 11y ago
    Things like key pinning are why control over TLDs doesn't equate to control over Gmail, which is my point.
    - xorcist 11y ago
      How is that relevant to DNSSEC? Key pinning works indepedently of how you validate your certificates (against public CAs, against DANE, or a combination of both).
      - tptacek 11y ago
        I'm lost. Why are we deploying DNSSEC again? I agree that HTTPS security comes down to things like key pinning, and not to giant PKIs.
        xorcist 11y ago
        Key pinning only works for players large enough to get pins in the client software itself. I can not do that, the best I have available is trust-on-first-use, which would carry a giant usability problem for the end user. I can set up DNSSEC and DANE today, everyone who cares gets an alternative validation path to me, and the Internet is safer because of it.
        tptacek 11y ago
        That hasn't been true for ages, and, in fact, wasn't even true when you had to had to ask Google to add pins: many of the people that had pins were tiny. You can set up DNSSEC and DANE today, but thankfully no browser gives a shit. Key pinning, however, will not only protect you, but will also get the CA that actually coughs up a forged cert for your site locked out of Chrome and Firefox.
        anon1385 11y ago
        Ok so I'm searching trying to work out how to get the cert for my blog pinned in Chrome or Firefox so that readers of my blog can detect the NSA MITMing them even on the first visit, but I'm not finding anything. Maybe I'm just using the wrong terms, but as far as I can see the number of sites pinned in Firefox is tiny: https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinn... and there is no process for getting sites added to that list. Could you give the address for the form where I can get my site pinned in Chrome?
        tptacek 11y ago
        You don't ask Chrome anymore, since Google spearheaded HPKP. Now you just use HPKP to do this.
- throwaway2048 11y ago
  you can do exactly the same things to check DANE-validated connections as you can for tradition ca validated ones. So on that front its as least as good as the CA model. The real advantages of dnssec+dane are: Your single registrar becomes your ca (who you already have to trust isnt hijacking your domain and issuing certs for it), not (potentially) every ca on earth. You can validate dns responses to be at least as real as the root dns servers claim. Nonpinned certs gain a lot better gaurentees against random CAs. (google cant pin every cert in chrome) It does not solve the problem of "what if the dns roots are lying to you", but as ca world cert aquisition is tied to that very same issue, neither does normal TLS.
  - tptacek 11y ago
    I'm lost in your argument. Help me understand: if I'm reliant on key pinning and cert transparency, which exists for TLS CAs but not for DNSSEC, what exactly is DNSSEC doing for me? Why is it interesting that I only depend on one untrustworthy (and irrevocable) CA?
    - throwaway2048 11y ago
      because its impossible to pin everyone and everything everywhere. No matter what you are stuck trusting that dns roots arn't being evil in the case of unpinned cert. At least with DNSSEC you arnt stuck additionally trusting every CA on earth in the case an attacker can mitm, but dosent control said tld.
      - tptacek 11y ago
        The one CA on Earth DNSSEC asks most Internet users to trust is controlled by the f^cking NSA. How is this progress?
        throwaway2048 11y ago
        because i would rather have to deal with the NSA, than everyone else + the NSA. The level of tampering required for the NSA to fake DNSSEC replies is very evident if you have the cert pinned, and very hard to deny. As things stand, its very easy to deny it was the NSA when anyone and their dog can have access to a CA cert.

tptacek 11y ago

Sorry, that's simply not true. Assholes control TLDs today, and they do not get to easily bypass Gmail TLS. My point is, of course, that DNSSEC creates more serious problems than it solves. If you think my argument is "DNSSEC isn't perfect and we should wait for perfection", you haven't read what I'm saying carefully enough.

xorcist 11y ago
> Assholes control TLDs today, and they do not get to easily bypass Gmail TLS. They absolutely do, which is why we have things like key pinning.
- tptacek 11y ago
  Things like key pinning are why control over TLDs doesn't equate to control over Gmail, which is my point.
  - xorcist 11y ago
    How is that relevant to DNSSEC? Key pinning works indepedently of how you validate your certificates (against public CAs, against DANE, or a combination of both).
    - tptacek 11y ago
      I'm lost. Why are we deploying DNSSEC again? I agree that HTTPS security comes down to things like key pinning, and not to giant PKIs.
      - xorcist 11y ago
        Key pinning only works for players large enough to get pins in the client software itself. I can not do that, the best I have available is trust-on-first-use, which would carry a giant usability problem for the end user. I can set up DNSSEC and DANE today, everyone who cares gets an alternative validation path to me, and the Internet is safer because of it.
        tptacek 11y ago
        That hasn't been true for ages, and, in fact, wasn't even true when you had to had to ask Google to add pins: many of the people that had pins were tiny. You can set up DNSSEC and DANE today, but thankfully no browser gives a shit. Key pinning, however, will not only protect you, but will also get the CA that actually coughs up a forged cert for your site locked out of Chrome and Firefox.
        anon1385 11y ago
        Ok so I'm searching trying to work out how to get the cert for my blog pinned in Chrome or Firefox so that readers of my blog can detect the NSA MITMing them even on the first visit, but I'm not finding anything. Maybe I'm just using the wrong terms, but as far as I can see the number of sites pinned in Firefox is tiny: https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinn... and there is no process for getting sites added to that list. Could you give the address for the form where I can get my site pinned in Chrome?
        tptacek 11y ago
        You don't ask Chrome anymore, since Google spearheaded HPKP. Now you just use HPKP to do this.
throwaway2048 11y ago
you can do exactly the same things to check DANE-validated connections as you can for tradition ca validated ones. So on that front its as least as good as the CA model. The real advantages of dnssec+dane are: Your single registrar becomes your ca (who you already have to trust isnt hijacking your domain and issuing certs for it), not (potentially) every ca on earth. You can validate dns responses to be at least as real as the root dns servers claim. Nonpinned certs gain a lot better gaurentees against random CAs. (google cant pin every cert in chrome) It does not solve the problem of "what if the dns roots are lying to you", but as ca world cert aquisition is tied to that very same issue, neither does normal TLS.
- tptacek 11y ago
  I'm lost in your argument. Help me understand: if I'm reliant on key pinning and cert transparency, which exists for TLS CAs but not for DNSSEC, what exactly is DNSSEC doing for me? Why is it interesting that I only depend on one untrustworthy (and irrevocable) CA?
  - throwaway2048 11y ago
    because its impossible to pin everyone and everything everywhere. No matter what you are stuck trusting that dns roots arn't being evil in the case of unpinned cert. At least with DNSSEC you arnt stuck additionally trusting every CA on earth in the case an attacker can mitm, but dosent control said tld.
    - tptacek 11y ago
      The one CA on Earth DNSSEC asks most Internet users to trust is controlled by the f^cking NSA. How is this progress?
      - throwaway2048 11y ago
        because i would rather have to deal with the NSA, than everyone else + the NSA. The level of tampering required for the NSA to fake DNSSEC replies is very evident if you have the cert pinned, and very hard to deny. As things stand, its very easy to deny it was the NSA when anyone and their dog can have access to a CA cert.