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Hypotheticly, lets say an intelligence agency/whoever keeps hijacking domains and then getting CAs to issue certs for them. The CA cannot automatically detect
by throwaway2048 11y ago
Hypotheticly, lets say an intelligence agency/whoever keeps hijacking domains and then getting CAs to issue certs for them.
The CA cannot automatically detect when a domain has been hijacked, it will issue the certs.
In this situation (with either the present DNS world, or dnscrypt), agencies are frankly 100% as unaccountable as they would be under DNSSEC world, because they still control the TLDs.
DNSCrypt does as little as DNSSEC to fix this issue. Pinning and certificate transparency can help detect under either scenario however.
Another concern in DNSCrypt is how does it handle the MITM problem between DNS servers? Trust on first sight is a lousy unscalable model (what if keys change, what if the badguys are already there before first contact) that is way more vulnerable than DNSSEC to forged replies.
- tptacek 11y agoWhile I don't agree with the particulars, I am not in fact a DNSCrypt advocate. I think the right next step for DNS security is "do nothing".
- throwaway2048 11y agoThe problem of "asshole controls the TLD" is not solvable via ANY protocol. That dosen't mean DNSSEC is worthless, or handing over the keys of the internet to the government or miscellaneous hyperventilating. You are falling into the classic trap of "this dosent solve every problem so we cannot permit it to solve any problem" that has held back security for decades. DNSSEC is real, it is deployable and stuff is capable of supporting it, and it does solve very real issues. That counts.
- tptacek 11y agoSorry, that's simply not true. Assholes control TLDs today, and they do not get to easily bypass Gmail TLS. My point is, of course, that DNSSEC creates more serious problems than it solves. If you think my argument is "DNSSEC isn't perfect and we should wait for perfection", you haven't read what I'm saying carefully enough.
- xorcist 11y ago> Assholes control TLDs today, and they do not get to easily bypass Gmail TLS. They absolutely do, which is why we have things like key pinning.
- tptacek 11y agoThings like key pinning are why control over TLDs doesn't equate to control over Gmail, which is my point.
- xorcist 11y agoHow is that relevant to DNSSEC? Key pinning works indepedently of how you validate your certificates (against public CAs, against DANE, or a combination of both).
- tptacek 11y agoI'm lost. Why are we deploying DNSSEC again? I agree that HTTPS security comes down to things like key pinning, and not to giant PKIs.
- xorcist 11y agoKey pinning only works for players large enough to get pins in the client software itself. I can not do that, the best I have available is trust-on-first-use, which would carry a giant usability problem for the end user. I can set up DNSSEC and DANE today, everyone who cares gets an alternative validation path to me, and the Internet is safer because of it.
- tptacek 11y agoThat hasn't been true for ages, and, in fact, wasn't even true when you had to had to ask Google to add pins: many of the people that had pins were tiny. You can set up DNSSEC and DANE today, but thankfully no browser gives a shit. Key pinning, however, will not only protect you, but will also get the CA that actually coughs up a forged cert for your site locked out of Chrome and Firefox.