5 ms·

I don't know about you, but I'd be VERY happy about a world where the established mail protocol (wether we like it or not) is not passively eavesdroppable (STAR

I don't know about you, but I'd be VERY happy about a world where the established mail protocol (wether we like it or not) is not passively eavesdroppable (STARTTLS being enough here) and where active attacks are hard, noisy and provable (enter DNSSEC+DANE). How would exactly have Tunisia stripped STARTTLS [0] if mail servers did DNSSEC+DANE to get pinned TLS certificates? [0] http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/imc/2015/papers/p27.pdf http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/imc/2015/papers/p27.pdf

tptacek 11y ago
I am not worried about attacks from Tunisia. I am worried about GCHQ. DNSSEC deters marginal threats at the cost of encouraging serious threats. That's not a good tradeoff.
- sarciszewski 11y ago
  > I am not worried about attacks from Tunisia. Why not? > I am worried about GCHQ. I don't contest this part.
  - tptacek 11y ago
    At least with respect to web security, even people in Tunisia can avoid Tunisian intercept just by not using Tunisian services. But virtually no one can avoid .COM.
    - sarciszewski 11y ago
      Oh. I was expecting something like, "I have secret knowledge that Tunisia's government employs less skilled attackers than the UK's."
  - deleted 11y ago
    [deleted]
yuhong 11y ago
To be honest, HSTS worked for HTTP pretty well, and it is not like mail servers are not commonly connected to either.