3 ms·

Considering that they're tracking time spent in queues, and (presumably) also recording video for security purposes, it's possible to associate a MAC address wi

Considering that they're tracking time spent in queues, and (presumably) also recording video for security purposes, it's possible to associate a MAC address with a person's face, and possibly a person's passport (if they're leaving the arrivals area and passing through passport control). Doesn't this constitute the very conjunction to which the guidance refers?

jeremysmyth 11y ago
Having passed through Dublin Airport many hundreds of times, I think it would be an interesting technical challenge mapping one MAC address to one individual given the hundreds of people milling around the security area at times. That is to say that, while possible, such a mapping is by no means easy or automatic, and it would have to be very calculated and deliberate and even then couldn't be 100% accurate without a whole lot of engineering. In such a case of deliberate and specific design to gather and associate MACs and identities, then yes, the law applies to such a conjunction.
- claudius 11y ago
  > challenge mapping one MAC address to one individual given the hundreds of people milling around the security area at times. You don’t have to work on a static set of MAC addresses and individuals, rather, you can dynamically track arrivals and departures from your crowd of individuals. So instead of hundreds of people being more or less stationary you get movement data on the few new members of the set and on those who left, including whereto or wherefrom they moved. After tracking not just one crowd but five, it should be possible to map out trajectories for both faces and MAC addresses. The larger the area or surveillance per traveller and differences in e.g. movement speed, the stronger the useful correlation between these trajectories should be.
  - jeremysmyth 11y ago
    Were I doing it I'd stick APs at the static bottlenecks, so pretty much at the xray scanners. That maximizes the ability to single out individuals. If I was really serious about it, I'd tie detection timing to the visual signals on the xray machines that tell security agents whether or not you can pass and whether to perform a secondary check.

jeremysmyth 11y ago

Having passed through Dublin Airport many hundreds of times, I think it would be an interesting technical challenge mapping one MAC address to one individual given the hundreds of people milling around the security area at times. That is to say that, while possible, such a mapping is by no means easy or automatic, and it would have to be very calculated and deliberate and even then couldn't be 100% accurate without a whole lot of engineering. In such a case of deliberate and specific design to gather and associate MACs and identities, then yes, the law applies to such a conjunction.

claudius 11y ago
> challenge mapping one MAC address to one individual given the hundreds of people milling around the security area at times. You don’t have to work on a static set of MAC addresses and individuals, rather, you can dynamically track arrivals and departures from your crowd of individuals. So instead of hundreds of people being more or less stationary you get movement data on the few new members of the set and on those who left, including whereto or wherefrom they moved. After tracking not just one crowd but five, it should be possible to map out trajectories for both faces and MAC addresses. The larger the area or surveillance per traveller and differences in e.g. movement speed, the stronger the useful correlation between these trajectories should be.
- jeremysmyth 11y ago
  Were I doing it I'd stick APs at the static bottlenecks, so pretty much at the xray scanners. That maximizes the ability to single out individuals. If I was really serious about it, I'd tie detection timing to the visual signals on the xray machines that tell security agents whether or not you can pass and whether to perform a secondary check.