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The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”
- PostThisTooFast 11y ago"Zero days"? WTF? Use real words and phrases, not bullshit.
- teej 11y agoFor those who don't know what a zero day is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day_(computing) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day_(computing)
- TACIXAT 11y agoA zero day is a non-publicly disclosed vulnerability. It's a very common term in the security community.
- drjesusphd 11y agoJust google it.
- drham 11y ago91% could also pretty misleading because not all vulnerabilities are equal. It's easy to let 9 potential segfaults or memory corruption issues get disclosed if you get to hold on to the 1 iOS Zero Day/Shellshock type attack/etc...
- nickpsecurity 11y agoYou beat me to it, haha. I was going to make the point that the vast majority of bugs found don't do anything significant for a hacker. A program crash or corruption at worst. It wouldn't surprise me if NSA just discloses the ones that hurt availability while weaponizing the few hitting confidentiality or integrity.
- SideburnsOfDoom 11y agoYep. Think of it as creaming off the top 9%.
- onewaystreet 11y agoDoes the EFF really expect the NSA to publicly detail every time they've used an exploit offensively?
- facetube 11y agoAgainst Americans? Yes. The rule of law demands it.
- hguant 11y agoI think you're misrepresenting what the rule of law means. The rule of law just means we follow codified rules, not the arbitrary whims of an individual. The NSA is, I'm sure, very scrupulous about following the law.
- EthanHeilman 11y agoI agree with the definition of 'the rule of law' you have given, however the point the above user was making is that government secrecy fundamentally undermines the rule of law since if no one knows what you are doing no one can determine if you are breaking the law. Its like trying to referee a football game while locked in a windowless basement 1000 miles away. The only information you get is that at half time a note is slipped under the door reading "No one has broken the rules".
- acdha 11y agoWe have repeated proof of the opposite – Congress had to rush to retroactively legalize the mass surveillance programs, and much of what's been disclosed since is clearly unconstitutional. What they are extremely good at is using security claims to avoid ever having to see a real court. Most of the cases have been thrown out for lack of standing because it's hard to prove that you've been spied on when all of the details are classified.
- ethanbond 11y agoClearly unconstitutional according to whom? It is valid to criticize the state secrets defense which keeps the NSA out of court – it's not valid to unilaterally decide what is and is not clearly unconstitutional.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoIt's good news to me. The NSA's mission means they're going to have to get in somehow. FBI, too. Bulk collection and subversion have huge issues. Targeted collection with 0-days in endpoints that we know are insecure is much closer to Constitution than most of what they do. If people want that to go away, they could always apply methods for building secure systems from ground up. I've posted plenty here and elsewhere about high assurance security along with tons of Comp Sci and case studies existing. If not, they've chosen to accept that risk from NSA and others hunting 0-days. Most choose that. Most platforms have tons of risk and attack surface. So, I'm all for them collecting 0-days for focused attacks and relying on it rather than pushing subversion or L.I. harder. Anyone worrying about this should be focusing on the organizations creating 0-days with known-insecure development practices rather than those exploiting them. They're the problem and the demand side (users/customers) that doesn't give a shit. Excerpt from a counterpoint to Bruce Schneier on why users/customers, not manufacturers, were the problem in terms of security of our devices and services: "Why does this problem (insecure everything) exist? Because manufacturers don't focus on building secure systems. Why don't they build secure systems? BECAUSE USERS DON'T BUY THEM! Most users want the risk management paradigm where they buy insecure systems that are fast, pretty and cheap, then occasionally deal with a data loss or system fix. The segment of people willing to pay significantly more for quality is always very small and there are vendors that target that market (e.g. TIS, GD, Boeing and Integrity Global Security come to mind). So, if users demand the opposite of security, aren't capitalist system producers supposed to give them what they want? It's basic economics Bruce. They do what's good for the bottom line. The only time they started building secure PC's en masse was when the government mandated them. Some corporations, part of the quality segment, even ordered them to protect I.P. at incubation firms and reduce insider risks at banks. When the government killed that & demand went low again, they all started producing insecure systems again. So, if user demand is required and they don't demand it, who is at fault again? The user. They always were and always will be. On the bright side, those same users are the reason I can send photo's to friends on a thin, beautiful smartphone. They also gave us short-lived 1TB hard disks whose low cost made the short-lived part tolerable. They are also probably why I have a full-featured, fast, cheap wireless router at the home. So, at least some good comes from the users choices of demand. But, they definitely don't accept the tradeoffs of real security, they don't demand it, it doesn't pay to produce it, & that's why it's their fault. "
- xenadu02 11y agoLet's just keep writing operating systems and security-sensitive code in C. I'm sure this time we'll have even better development practices. This time we'll do better code reviews. This time the static analysis tools will catch more problems. If we all close our eyes and wish really hard we can avoid inconveniencing a few programmers, save a few CPU cycles, and keep using C. After all, the performance is totally worth a few heartbleeds now and again ya?
- LukeShu 11y agohttp://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/heartbleed-in-rust http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/heartbleed-in-rust I tried writing my own commentary to go with the link, but I decided that it would just be a bad paraphrasing of tedunangst's writing.
- hartator 11y agoI don't get if you are sarcastic or not.
- notacoward 11y agoThe issue is not writing such software in some other language. The issue is rewriting such software in some other language. That's a very very large pile of functionality to implement all over again. In the process new bugs will be introduced, including new security bugs. While it's easy enough to write a toy system in some other language and get a paper published, a more fruitful approach for making a real world system secure is to do so incrementally. Look at the L4 family of microkernels for an example.
- Spivak 11y agoWhat do you consider to be a safer language? It seems like in most 'safe' languages you are relying on the language implementer to provide security and the compiler to basically catch the same mistakes that the static analysis tools do. You could consider this a variant of, "don't roll your own" but when a vulnerability is discovered it might be out of your control until the next release.
- DGAP 11y agoIt seems somewhat absurd to blame the existence of bugs and zero day vulnerabilities on one language, especially when that language is one of the best supported and most powerful. Unless you can figure out a way to remove humans from both the creation and use of software, I anticipate we'll have issues like these for the foreseeable future. Of course, HN commenters like you probably think if we all switched to Go or Swift there'd never be any bugs ever again...
- graycat 11y agoTime for software vendors to plug the zero day holes. More generally, need some assurances. In addition, need some good zero day detection means.
- Animats 11y agoNow the question is, are vendors deliberately putting in security flaws at NSA's instigation? Intel's "system management mode" and code need to be viewed with extreme suspicion. So do network controllers which accept management commands from the network side. It would be so easy to add some system management passwords to a network controller that don't show up when you list them. (In fact, if you're willing to have them show up in a list that nobody ever checks, you can insert a backdoor in a motherboard if you can get hold of it anywhere in the supply chain, hook it up to power and Ethernet, and talk to it briefly.)[1] [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_AMT_versions https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_AMT_versions
- eliteraspberrie 11y agoI doubt the NSA needs to instigate much. There is so much bad code in the world, and it just keeps growing, they would be in business forever just sitting on their thumbs.
- akshatpradhan 11y ago>There is so much bad code in the world, and it just keeps growing Security Compliance is hygiene and reduces the attack surface. We should all be more diligent about complying to reduce the bad code.
- davidgerard 11y agoThe Onion: China Unable To Recruit Hackers Fast Enough To Keep Up With Vulnerabilities In U.S. Security Systems http://www.theonion.com/article/china-unable-recruit-hackers-fast-enough-keep-vuln-51719 http://www.theonion.com/article/china-unable-recruit-hackers...
- agopaul 11y agoI doubt that. It would be a massive PR shitstorm if something like this exists and get exposed. Though it's also true that NSA is known for intercepting specific shippings of electronic goods and plant hardware backdoors. It would be interesting to know how this things work and operate on the target device.
- mmytest 11y agoI like it
- houselync 11y agoThank for you information