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This article seems silly: Both the Copenhagen and Multiple Worlds interpretation (as far as I understand, as a non-physicist) yield the same objective answers,
by drcode 11y ago
This article seems silly: Both the Copenhagen and Multiple Worlds interpretation (as far as I understand, as a non-physicist) yield the same objective answers, so deciding on one interpretation or the other is really a matter of "taste" for the physicists involved... in a way, each physicist can arbitrarily decide for themselves which interpretation they find most useful for their work.
Now Mr. Philip Ball comes along, who isn't a thoretical physicist AFAIK, and says that the MWI people are doing it wrong.
In this article, the only concrete argument he gives for why MWI is "wrong" is because it blurs the idea of "self", which the author finds distasteful. But science doesn't "care" about tastefulness, all it cares about is hypotheses, experiments and repeatability. Unless the author can cite an experiment that shows MWI to be invalid (or alternatively can make a formal argument as to why it represents a needlessly complex hypothesis, ala Occam's Razor) he is not basing his argument on a scientific foundation.
- meowface 11y agoYeah, this article presents attempts to prevent a philosophical argument for why the MWI is inherently illogical, but fails miserably. His point about it being an untestable theory, and one which has no particular empirical evidence, is valid, though.
- eridius 11y agoMWI isn't scientific to begin with. As you said, it's indistinguishable from Copenhagen as far as prediction and testability is concerned. The only reason to prefer MWI is for whiffy non-scientific reasons, and that's what this article is challenging.
- Houshalter 11y agoHow is any less scientific than Copenhagen? As I understand it they are both equally valid hypotheses. But people prefer MWI because it's simpler or makes more sense.
- eridius 11y agoIt's not less scientific. It's scientifically identical to Copenhagen (because it makes identical predictions with identical assumptions). But the distinguishing characteristics of MWI (the bits that make it "not Copenhagen") are non-scientific, as they are non-falsifiable.
- Houshalter 11y agoSee dkbrk's comment on this thread. MWI follows naturally from our models of quantum physics. It doesn't make any additional assumptions. It's the simplest possible model that fits the data. It's Copenhagen that makes additional, untestable assumptions. And therefore, by your logic, is unscientific. That is, Copenhagen asserts that the quantum states we don't observe, are destroyed. They have to exist, in some sense, to provide the weird entanglement effects we observe in quantum physics. The whole "the cat is both dead and alive at the same time" thing. MWI just follows naturally from these observations. Copenhagen assumes that there is only one universe, without any justification for this assumption. It assumes that the quantum states we don't observe just cease to exist. It assumes some source of randomness, when "universe splitting" is sufficient to explain observed randomness. It adds a bunch of weirdness that isn't necessary.
- visarga 11y agoIf MWI is not good, then how do we account for the Fine-tuned Universe paradox? It would seem our universe is just right for life, with an incredibly precise fine tuning of the fundamental constants. That leaves us with deciding if it was designed to be just right or it is just one of many possible worlds, most of which are devoid of life. In my opinion postulating an infinite number of parallel universes we can't reach is just as big of a leap of faith as believing in a creator that prefers life to dead universes. Maybe it's self guiding towards life, or do we just happen to be in a special universe?
- eridius 11y agoMWI really has nothing to do with the Fine-tuned Universe paradox. That paradox has to do with the fundamental physical constants being just right to allow for life. But the many worlds in MWI aren't worlds in which the fundamental constants are different, but rather they're worlds in which quantum probabilities collapsed in different ways. In fact, of al the infinitude of worlds in MWI, they all must share the same physical constants, because, for every quantum decision, only physically possible results are represented by parallel worlds, and there's no quantum mechanism that can change the fundamental physical constants altering reality. Given that, you can easily reject MWI while still accepting the parallel universes explanation for the Fine-tuned Universe paradox (namely, that there's an infinity of universes with different physical constants, which solves the paradox quite neatly because only in universes with constants "tuned" just right for life can there arise life capable of thinking of the Fine-tuned Universe paradox, which turns the paradox into a straightforward example of the Anthropic principle). Or you could reject the parallel universes explanation for Fine-tuned Universe while still believing in MWI for quantum effects.
- AReallyGoodName 11y agoIf you can't distinguish MWI from any other interpretations results than doesn't that also indicate that the other interpretations have just as many issues? In fact given the name is suffixed with interpretation I really don't get the authors point. We have a way of thinking about things, nothing more, hence that suffix.As you point out it's scientifically indistinguishable from other interpretations. So why pick on MWI. Why not write the exact same speil about the Copenhagen interpretation which is no more or less testable (if it was we'd be able to distinguish its results from the other interpretations)
- eridius 11y agoBecause the complaint isn't that it isn't testable. Since we're talking about non-testable properties of these models, the only way in which they differ is in how we think about them, which puts this in the realm of philosophy. And the article is arguing that the philosophical implications of MWI are problematic.