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Could someone post the text of this blog entry here into Hacker News Comments (if doing so isn't a copyright violation)? I live in China, therefore can't read t

by vorg 17y ago

Could someone post the text of this blog entry here into Hacker News Comments (if doing so isn't a copyright violation)? I live in China, therefore can't read the blog post (though have deduced much of its content from reading these comments!) Before the Olympics, the Firewall would periodically block blogspot, but it was easy to get around it using proxies. However, post-Olympics, in May 2009, all of blogspot was blocked (not just those dealing with Fln G*ng, etc), including through proxies, newsfeeds, everything. Every few weeks, new sites are blocked. It seems the Olympics was a minor P.R. obstacle to the unrestricted censorship they really wanted; once over, the censors have gone into free fall. The blockages seems arbitrary. One can almost understand a line of logic whereby all blogspot blogs are blocked, e.g. "The users are anonymous, their details not verifiable by our government officials..." blah blah. But how can you explain blocking http://www.python.org/download/ http://www.python.org/download/ and subpages, blocked here for the last 3 to 6 months? The other Python website pages are accessible, just not the download page. Where's the logic in that? Those of us living here for a while automatically assume some other competing scripting language rep paid off some friend working at the censor bureau. "Who watches the watchers?" as they say. Once a certain site has been blocked, it never reverts. Some people here are starting to call the internet available within China a "Countrinet".

nikils 17y ago
A new approach to China 1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident--albeit a significant one--was something quite different. First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors--have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities. Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves. Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers. We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident. We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today. We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China." These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China. The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised. Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer
- vorg 17y ago
  Thanks!
adrianwaj 17y ago
Would an email list that emails out a new proxy web address once one gets blocked to its subscribers work? -- there is some open source code that can be setup to run as a proxy app -- there's a main site that pings it to see when it goes down, or an email address that can be mailed if it goes down. -- once blocked, a new email goes out to users with the next proxy server web address that has already been setup and ready to use: an IP, domain or sub domain url -- so it's like dominoes falling and the current one standing is what people use, as new dominoes are setup in the background Challenge: 1) finding a ready supply of IP addresses, domains, and URLs where new proxies can be setup 2) making sure the emails aren't blocked 3) plugin so it works transparently for the end user
- vorg 17y ago
  It used to be in China you could get to blogspot easily through proxies. If a proxy server was blocked, you could then find another unblocked one easily enough. But since the Olympics, a new method of blocking blogspot seems to be in place. Even when the proxy is available, as soon as the blogspot content starts streaming, it's cut off. The post-Olympic firewall seems to be sensitive to the content when it's blogspot blogs.
  - adrianwaj 17y ago
    How about blogspot content via feedburner? The firewall's probably looking for blogspot characteristics in the html coming through (ie the themes) -- but grabbing the same blog posts through feedburner (and rss in general) could circumvent this filter. Although, in such feeds, you wouldn't want any blogspot.com links.

by vorg 17y ago

nikils 17y ago

A new approach to China 1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident--albeit a significant one--was something quite different. First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors--have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities. Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves. Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers. We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident. We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China's economic reform programs and its citizens' entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today. We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China." These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China. The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised. Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer

vorg 17y ago
Thanks!

adrianwaj 17y ago

Would an email list that emails out a new proxy web address once one gets blocked to its subscribers work? -- there is some open source code that can be setup to run as a proxy app -- there's a main site that pings it to see when it goes down, or an email address that can be mailed if it goes down. -- once blocked, a new email goes out to users with the next proxy server web address that has already been setup and ready to use: an IP, domain or sub domain url -- so it's like dominoes falling and the current one standing is what people use, as new dominoes are setup in the background Challenge: 1) finding a ready supply of IP addresses, domains, and URLs where new proxies can be setup 2) making sure the emails aren't blocked 3) plugin so it works transparently for the end user

vorg 17y ago
It used to be in China you could get to blogspot easily through proxies. If a proxy server was blocked, you could then find another unblocked one easily enough. But since the Olympics, a new method of blocking blogspot seems to be in place. Even when the proxy is available, as soon as the blogspot content starts streaming, it's cut off. The post-Olympic firewall seems to be sensitive to the content when it's blogspot blogs.
- adrianwaj 17y ago
  How about blogspot content via feedburner? The firewall's probably looking for blogspot characteristics in the html coming through (ie the themes) -- but grabbing the same blog posts through feedburner (and rss in general) could circumvent this filter. Although, in such feeds, you wouldn't want any blogspot.com links.