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I think these types of concerns may eventually be addressed by better and more consistent use of encrypt-in-place in application design. If your data is well en
by snowwrestler 11y ago
I think these types of concerns may eventually be addressed by better and more consistent use of encrypt-in-place in application design. If your data is well encrypted, theoretically it should be safe from the NSA even if they get their hands on the files.
Encrypt-in-transit is well along in terms of culture and technology. "SSL everywhere" is something that, I think, most folks believe we can achieve. Google, for example, has said that eventually Chrome will start marking all HTTP connections as insecure.
But how many hosted apps being designed today will encrypt all their stored data from the start? I would guess almost none. Even though that is where the smart folks go to steal data: where it's resting. Just sitting there for anyone to grab once they get through the perimeter.
What if all data was encrypted at rest by default? It's an idea worth thinking about.
- rifung 11y agoI'm pretty sure most people have thought about doing this; the issue is that with our current technology, the overhead is too large to be practical. At least, that was my understanding in the matter when I was doing some cryptography related research. On the other hand, a lot of research is striving towards that goal. A method for fully homomorphic encryption was very recently discovered, and although it is still way too slow to be practical, the fact that we finally figured out a way to do it after several decades of searching is a huge step.
- taejo 11y agoEven if all data is encrypted at rest, you can still learn a huge amount from access patterns. You need some kind of Oblivious RAM (which could perhaps be better named Oblivious Disk) where the cloud server doesn't even know the metadata (e.g. which disk sector) it's serving, let alone the content. Cryptographers know how to do this in theory, but the overhead is pretty big.