I would assume that this only works on an unlocked (unencrypted) database in-memory. This is a cool tool for an attacker, but I would guess that almost all vir

I would assume that this only works on an unlocked (unencrypted) database in-memory. This is a cool tool for an attacker, but I would guess that almost all virtual password managers are vulnerable to it and that this 'vulnerability' is not specific to Keepass, this is just an implementation. The only way to mitigate this attack vector 'somewhat' is having the database lock after a timeout and don't leave it unlocked all the time. I would guess this is true for all password managers. But I'm happy to be told differently. In general, I think a Keepass tool is nice for private use, but because of the nature of these tools, I would use a kind of centralised password server with RBAC to limit the scope of a breach.