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> That's a mainstream mantra but not true at all against High Strength Attackers (HSA's). They always have more resources than you do. That's why obscurity doe
by AnthonyMouse 11y ago
> That's a mainstream mantra but not true at all against High Strength Attackers (HSA's). They always have more resources than you do.
That's why obscurity doesn't work. An attacker with many resources can reverse engineer whatever concealment you've concocted but the concealment is enough to deter other researchers who would have published their results from analyzing your system. So then the HSA knows of the attack and can take advantage of it but you don't so you can't counter it.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoNonsense. The attacker must expend significant effort to identify both the product- and user-specific obfuscations. That by itself does two things: (a) reduce number that can afford to attack you; (b) possibly force individual attacks instead of one size fits all. On top of this, there's a range of monitoring and tamper-resistance measures that can be employed. So, the result of such obfuscations plus strong, proven methods stops most attackers outright, helps catch some, and at least slows/limits others. Compare that to a situation where every detail is known and TCB (esp hardware & kernel) are same for all users. Find flaw easily, compromise any. That's your model. See the NSA TAO catalog and any reporting of mass hacks to see where that led. Your method simply doesnt work and is defeated even by average attackers. Whereas mine has held off many in practice with the few failures due to over-privileged, malicious insiders. Learn from the evidence. Apply strong methods, obfuscation, diversity, and detection in combination. Or High Strength Attackers own you without breaking a sweat.
- AnthonyMouse 11y agoYour argument is upside down. Unraveling obfuscation costs time and money, which means it may be able to deter amateurs (though the history of DRM implies it can't even do that). State-level attackers have nearly unlimited resources. You can't defeat them by costing them money because their money comes out of your paycheck. The only way to defend against them, if you have the hubris to think you're even capable of it, is to find and remove the vulnerabilities so there is nothing for them to exploit. Which makes obfuscation counterproductive because it makes things harder for whitehats who would otherwise help you. And diversity and obscurity are separate things so the diversity argument is a non-sequitur.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoOk, let's put your method to the test with a simple use case. There's two protocols for secure messaging: 1. The popular one that's been battle-tested, is written in C, and uses one algorithm in a specific way. 2. My method which starts with that protocol, applies a technique for protecting C code, uses 2-3 of AES candidates, has a different initial counter value, and a port-knocking scheme. Each of these are unknown and randomized on a per user-group basis. You have an encryption or protocol flaw. Your goal is to intercept these users' communications. You do not have an attack on their endpoints. Which of (1) or (2) is harder? Your argument already fails at this point. Let's continue, though. You first have to figure out the portknocking scheme. That means you must identify which part of the packet headers or data are used to do it plus how its done plus attack how its done. This is already a ridiculously hard problem evidenced by the fact that nobody's ever bypassed it when I used it: always went straight for endpoints or social engineering attempts. Using a deniable strategy like SILENTKNOCK can make it provably impossible for them to even know it's in use. Next are the ciphers. They don't know which one is in use. The non-security-critical values fed into it are randomized in such a way that they might have to try more possibilities than are in the universe just to start the attack. A weakness in any one algorithm won't help them. Unlike most SW people, I also address covert channels: no leaks to help them. What are odds your attack will work on my users? Next is the protocol engine. This is where they have a solid chance of screwing me up because mainstream loves dangerous languages, OS's, and ISA's. However, there are dozens of ways to obfuscate/immunize C code against most likely attacks and safe system languages I can reimplement it in while checking assembler. Further, if I make it static & a FSM, I can use tools like Astree for C or SPARK Ada to prove it free of errors. Without the binary and w/ limited online attacks, these guys would have to be geniuses to find an attack on it. After they beat the port-knocking scheme that was designed similarly... The use of provably strong mechanisms in layers is in NSA's own evaluation criteria as the kind of thing that stops nation-states. And stopped NSA's own red teams in the past during A1/EAL6/EAL7 evaluations. They depend on it for most critical stuff. Applying sound principles plus things easy for defender but exponentially harder for attacker makes a fence so high even nation-states have trouble jumping over it. They're forced to do one of several things: use very best attacks that might be lost during a detection; get physical, increasing odds of detection; ignore you to attack someone else for reasons of cost-effectiveness and keeping their best stuff stealthy. They usually do the latter that I see, even NSA per Snowden leaks. Of course, I'm sure you and others on your side will continue handing them your source, protocols, exact configurations, and so on to enable them to smash it. I'm sure you'll use the reference implementation without any changes so one attack affects you along with hundreds of thousands to millions. However, anyone that wants enemies to work for their system should take my approach as it provably increases their difficulty so much that almost all of them will leave you alone or try other attack vectors. This strategy should be applied from ISA to OS to client & server software. And if you have holistic security, you'll prevent or eventually detect most of their other attacks, too. Worst case, one or two of the elite groups get in while you're still safe from the others (esp most damaging). Still better than the "give it all to all of them" approach to security you're endorsing.