The distinction between "useful" and "unusually useful" for criminal purposes is a very important one. It might be worth highlighting more explicitly in the art

The distinction between "useful" and "unusually useful" for criminal purposes is a very important one. It might be worth highlighting more explicitly in the article, since it sounds like you may be the author. > "Success" that doesn't accomplish the rest of our goals isn't success at all I'm not talking about survival, I'm talking about success. In the article you draw a distinction between failure by death ("range safety") and failure by incorrectness ("mature non-republic"); the remaining option, then, would be success -- including meeting your goals. My point is that survival is implicit in this definition of success, and from a risk management standpoint, political pressure from entities like the FBI is a very real threat. Many of us understand that the FBI's argument is enormously problematic, but that's largely irrelevant: they think it's valid, and that's all that matters when they're the ones applying real-world political pressure. Put plainly: the FBI is advocating changing laws to make strong end-to-end cryptography illegal (unless the feds have access, which by definition isn't E2EE). This pressure is a real-world fact; what are you doing to mitigate it? Or what about Turkey, where it's already quasi-illegal?