7 ms·

Design of a digital republic

42 points by state 11y ago

state 11y ago
Also available in the urbit docs: http://urbit.org/docs/theory/network-goals http://urbit.org/docs/theory/network-goals which are served from an urbit.
nbadg 11y ago
This is a really interesting article, and it's nice to see a lengthy discussion of treating sites like Reddit, Facebook, etc as a kind of digital nation-state. But one point in particular bothered me (and perhaps I'm misreading it): > It’s incumbent on anyone creating a new network of any kind not just to avoid using it yourself for criminal purposes, but to design it so that it’s not useful for criminal purposes. Isn't a network, by definition, useful for criminal purposes? Perhaps the author means not more useful for criminal purposes than for legal ones, but what exactly might that mean? And by whose laws are we describing criminality? I also think this argument is tremendously problematic, maybe even self-defeating, in the context of encryption. If we, as the author proposes, were to have a network designed from the beginning to be capable of eventual decentralization [1], doesn't that imply heavy use of cryptography? I can't imagine a digital network where you can create privacy (and therefore agency) any other way. And yet clearly, government entities like the FBI are publicly railing against encryption as a useful tool for terrorists and criminals. Plenty of people, myself included, find this policy debate to be frighteningly under-informed, but if your goal is to avoid government attention to maximize the chances for success, it's not our opinion that matters, it's the FBI's. So I think think this kind of friction is unavoidable, implying the smart money is on people who can cleverly minimize its impact. [1] On a related note, I'm working on exactly this problem, at a protocol level. If you're curious, check out our documentation repo https://github.com/Muterra/doc-muse https://github.com/Muterra/doc-muse
- pcmonk 11y ago
  Almost anything is useful for criminal purposes. The point is that if something is unusually useful for criminal purposes (e.g. megaupload), then it will be heavily scrutinized. Just because crowbars are useful for crime doesn't get them regulated. Anthrax, on the other hand, does. You are correct that privacy without cryptography is infeasible. Urbit definitely does make heavy use of cryptography. Some government agencies may not appreciate this, but the point of the cryptography isn't primarily so that the NSA can't read it, but that other people don't impersonate you. It's important to not only not violate the current letter of the law, but also the spirit of the law. The goal isn't simply to minimize government attention to maximize the chance of "success". "Success" that doesn't accomplish the rest of our goals isn't success at all, so there are some things that Urbit can't compromise on.
  - nbadg 11y ago
    The distinction between "useful" and "unusually useful" for criminal purposes is a very important one. It might be worth highlighting more explicitly in the article, since it sounds like you may be the author. > "Success" that doesn't accomplish the rest of our goals isn't success at all I'm not talking about survival, I'm talking about success. In the article you draw a distinction between failure by death ("range safety") and failure by incorrectness ("mature non-republic"); the remaining option, then, would be success -- including meeting your goals. My point is that survival is implicit in this definition of success, and from a risk management standpoint, political pressure from entities like the FBI is a very real threat. Many of us understand that the FBI's argument is enormously problematic, but that's largely irrelevant: they think it's valid, and that's all that matters when they're the ones applying real-world political pressure. Put plainly: the FBI is advocating changing laws to make strong end-to-end cryptography illegal (unless the feds have access, which by definition isn't E2EE). This pressure is a real-world fact; what are you doing to mitigate it? Or what about Turkey, where it's already quasi-illegal?
    - yarvin9 11y ago
      It's certainly a tradeoff which admits no perfect success. Yes, any network that isn't hosted on the FBI's own servers can be used for some sort of crime. Fortunately, in our real republic as it stands, there's a relatively wide margin of safety between government-pwned networking on the top, and a darknet on the bottom. Let's hope it persists.
    - pcmonk 11y ago
      I'm not the author, but I do work for Urbit. Sure, success is impossible without survival. But survival without e2e crypto can't be success, which is why it's baked into the system. Some risks are avoidable while some aren't. How do we mitigate this risk? Don't give the FBI any reason to worry about us in particular. Don't market to unsavory types. Be above board and make a useful service that lots of people use. Nothing more complicated than that.
  - forgotmysn 11y ago
    The exact opposite should be true, and Anthrax is the perfect example. We should be building great shit because great shit betters humanity, agnostic to possible criminal misuse of said shit. Anthrax has no utility beyond criminal activity, and honestly I would consider anything that utilizes anthrax in that way to be criminal at all; thats terroristic. Crime is extrinsically motivated, terror intrinsic, and the use of Anthrax can only be physical harm, there is no greater reward to the applier. But Megaupload is a tool that lets us share ideas and forms of art that people in some parts of the world may not have had the opportunity be exposed to otherwise. Even if it can be used for crime, that is not the only function it is capable of performing. Megaupload is exactly the model for products we should be building, because the sharing of ideas helps elevate us as a society. The minor and short term side-effect of piracy is irrelevant.
Animats 11y ago
The article is more of a random rant - all whining, no solutions. It's not about a "digital republic" at all. There have been proposals for governmental systems with lots of online voting, but this isn't one of them. Federated systems work fine technically, but few have achieved widespread use. USENET was quite successful, but Google effectively took it over. (Google Groups was originally just a USENET node, but now most people are unaware that many "Google Groups" are really USENET groups, with traffic flowing in both directions, and you don't need a Google account to access them from the USENET side.[1]) If there's no place where someone can put a boot on the air hose and cut off the air supply, systems are not highly profitable. This is why federated systems are not widely successful. [1] https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/comp.lang.c++ https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/comp.lang.c++
- pcmonk 11y ago
  It's true that this is primarily a rant, in that it doesn't describe a solution. Part 2 (coming) will describe the solution that we at Urbit have implemented. If you don't want to wait for that, check out the other documentation on urbit.org.
  - ternbot 11y ago
    Great stuff everyone, but thinking at the software level is a bit shallow; we must start over with ternary hardware; for the people, by the people #nanotothemasses
- yarvin9 11y ago
  As I hope TFA makes clear, "republic" is not a synonym for "democracy." [1] If it's possible to build something useful and effective with "lots of online voting," I don't know of any examples. Successful multipolar/federated systems (which are republican enough for me, anyway) have existed. Like Usenet. As a Usenet veteran, I have a tough time with the idea that Google killed Usenet. Google bought DejaNews in 2001, and Usenet was already pretty dead in 2001. Yes, some Usenet groups survived and have become effectively Google groups, but without Google I suspect they'd just be dead. The conventional wisdom, which seems right to me, is that Eternal September killed Usenet (with the assistance of alt.binaries). It would be interesting to see an argument against this theory. You also seem to be suggesting that Usenet died because it wasn't profitable enough. I suppose it wasn't profitable enough to carry alt.binaries. But its costs, for regular text posts, didn't seem extreme even in the 90s. In fact, not to get all commie on you, but one of the neat things about Usenet as a digital republic was that no one owned it, and no one profited from it. The positive social value of this principle is seen in a variety of institutions. Compare to Burning Man, for instance. Who would show up for burningman.com, a subsidiary of Ticketmaster? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic (edit: formatting)
Rmilb 11y ago
>It’s incumbent on anyone creating a new network of any kind not just to avoid using it yourself for criminal purposes, but to design it so that it’s not useful for criminal purposes. What happens when your point of view is "criminalized"?
- yarvin9 11y ago
  As a practical matter? You censor yourself. And/or practice the great art of Ketman [1]. Criminalizing points of view is harder to implement, as a practical matter, than criminalizing behavior that most people today see as actual, victimful crimes. There's no equivalent of "grass mud horse" [2] for terrorism, childporn, etc. As the Chinese government is very aware, even a well-censored network is way more dangerous to them than no network at all. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ketman https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ketman [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grass_Mud_Horse https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grass_Mud_Horse

42 points by state 11y ago

state 11y ago

Also available in the urbit docs: http://urbit.org/docs/theory/network-goals http://urbit.org/docs/theory/network-goals which are served from an urbit.

nbadg 11y ago

This is a really interesting article, and it's nice to see a lengthy discussion of treating sites like Reddit, Facebook, etc as a kind of digital nation-state. But one point in particular bothered me (and perhaps I'm misreading it): > It’s incumbent on anyone creating a new network of any kind not just to avoid using it yourself for criminal purposes, but to design it so that it’s not useful for criminal purposes. Isn't a network, by definition, useful for criminal purposes? Perhaps the author means not more useful for criminal purposes than for legal ones, but what exactly might that mean? And by whose laws are we describing criminality? I also think this argument is tremendously problematic, maybe even self-defeating, in the context of encryption. If we, as the author proposes, were to have a network designed from the beginning to be capable of eventual decentralization [1], doesn't that imply heavy use of cryptography? I can't imagine a digital network where you can create privacy (and therefore agency) any other way. And yet clearly, government entities like the FBI are publicly railing against encryption as a useful tool for terrorists and criminals. Plenty of people, myself included, find this policy debate to be frighteningly under-informed, but if your goal is to avoid government attention to maximize the chances for success, it's not our opinion that matters, it's the FBI's. So I think think this kind of friction is unavoidable, implying the smart money is on people who can cleverly minimize its impact. [1] On a related note, I'm working on exactly this problem, at a protocol level. If you're curious, check out our documentation repo https://github.com/Muterra/doc-muse https://github.com/Muterra/doc-muse

pcmonk 11y ago
Almost anything is useful for criminal purposes. The point is that if something is unusually useful for criminal purposes (e.g. megaupload), then it will be heavily scrutinized. Just because crowbars are useful for crime doesn't get them regulated. Anthrax, on the other hand, does. You are correct that privacy without cryptography is infeasible. Urbit definitely does make heavy use of cryptography. Some government agencies may not appreciate this, but the point of the cryptography isn't primarily so that the NSA can't read it, but that other people don't impersonate you. It's important to not only not violate the current letter of the law, but also the spirit of the law. The goal isn't simply to minimize government attention to maximize the chance of "success". "Success" that doesn't accomplish the rest of our goals isn't success at all, so there are some things that Urbit can't compromise on.
- nbadg 11y ago
  The distinction between "useful" and "unusually useful" for criminal purposes is a very important one. It might be worth highlighting more explicitly in the article, since it sounds like you may be the author. > "Success" that doesn't accomplish the rest of our goals isn't success at all I'm not talking about survival, I'm talking about success. In the article you draw a distinction between failure by death ("range safety") and failure by incorrectness ("mature non-republic"); the remaining option, then, would be success -- including meeting your goals. My point is that survival is implicit in this definition of success, and from a risk management standpoint, political pressure from entities like the FBI is a very real threat. Many of us understand that the FBI's argument is enormously problematic, but that's largely irrelevant: they think it's valid, and that's all that matters when they're the ones applying real-world political pressure. Put plainly: the FBI is advocating changing laws to make strong end-to-end cryptography illegal (unless the feds have access, which by definition isn't E2EE). This pressure is a real-world fact; what are you doing to mitigate it? Or what about Turkey, where it's already quasi-illegal?
  - yarvin9 11y ago
    It's certainly a tradeoff which admits no perfect success. Yes, any network that isn't hosted on the FBI's own servers can be used for some sort of crime. Fortunately, in our real republic as it stands, there's a relatively wide margin of safety between government-pwned networking on the top, and a darknet on the bottom. Let's hope it persists.
  - pcmonk 11y ago
    I'm not the author, but I do work for Urbit. Sure, success is impossible without survival. But survival without e2e crypto can't be success, which is why it's baked into the system. Some risks are avoidable while some aren't. How do we mitigate this risk? Don't give the FBI any reason to worry about us in particular. Don't market to unsavory types. Be above board and make a useful service that lots of people use. Nothing more complicated than that.
- forgotmysn 11y ago
  The exact opposite should be true, and Anthrax is the perfect example. We should be building great shit because great shit betters humanity, agnostic to possible criminal misuse of said shit. Anthrax has no utility beyond criminal activity, and honestly I would consider anything that utilizes anthrax in that way to be criminal at all; thats terroristic. Crime is extrinsically motivated, terror intrinsic, and the use of Anthrax can only be physical harm, there is no greater reward to the applier. But Megaupload is a tool that lets us share ideas and forms of art that people in some parts of the world may not have had the opportunity be exposed to otherwise. Even if it can be used for crime, that is not the only function it is capable of performing. Megaupload is exactly the model for products we should be building, because the sharing of ideas helps elevate us as a society. The minor and short term side-effect of piracy is irrelevant.

Animats 11y ago

The article is more of a random rant - all whining, no solutions. It's not about a "digital republic" at all. There have been proposals for governmental systems with lots of online voting, but this isn't one of them. Federated systems work fine technically, but few have achieved widespread use. USENET was quite successful, but Google effectively took it over. (Google Groups was originally just a USENET node, but now most people are unaware that many "Google Groups" are really USENET groups, with traffic flowing in both directions, and you don't need a Google account to access them from the USENET side.[1]) If there's no place where someone can put a boot on the air hose and cut off the air supply, systems are not highly profitable. This is why federated systems are not widely successful. [1] https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/comp.lang.c++ https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/comp.lang.c++

pcmonk 11y ago
It's true that this is primarily a rant, in that it doesn't describe a solution. Part 2 (coming) will describe the solution that we at Urbit have implemented. If you don't want to wait for that, check out the other documentation on urbit.org.
- ternbot 11y ago
  Great stuff everyone, but thinking at the software level is a bit shallow; we must start over with ternary hardware; for the people, by the people #nanotothemasses
yarvin9 11y ago
As I hope TFA makes clear, "republic" is not a synonym for "democracy." [1] If it's possible to build something useful and effective with "lots of online voting," I don't know of any examples. Successful multipolar/federated systems (which are republican enough for me, anyway) have existed. Like Usenet. As a Usenet veteran, I have a tough time with the idea that Google killed Usenet. Google bought DejaNews in 2001, and Usenet was already pretty dead in 2001. Yes, some Usenet groups survived and have become effectively Google groups, but without Google I suspect they'd just be dead. The conventional wisdom, which seems right to me, is that Eternal September killed Usenet (with the assistance of alt.binaries). It would be interesting to see an argument against this theory. You also seem to be suggesting that Usenet died because it wasn't profitable enough. I suppose it wasn't profitable enough to carry alt.binaries. But its costs, for regular text posts, didn't seem extreme even in the 90s. In fact, not to get all commie on you, but one of the neat things about Usenet as a digital republic was that no one owned it, and no one profited from it. The positive social value of this principle is seen in a variety of institutions. Compare to Burning Man, for instance. Who would show up for burningman.com, a subsidiary of Ticketmaster? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic (edit: formatting)

Rmilb 11y ago

>It’s incumbent on anyone creating a new network of any kind not just to avoid using it yourself for criminal purposes, but to design it so that it’s not useful for criminal purposes. What happens when your point of view is "criminalized"?

yarvin9 11y ago
As a practical matter? You censor yourself. And/or practice the great art of Ketman [1]. Criminalizing points of view is harder to implement, as a practical matter, than criminalizing behavior that most people today see as actual, victimful crimes. There's no equivalent of "grass mud horse" [2] for terrorism, childporn, etc. As the Chinese government is very aware, even a well-censored network is way more dangerous to them than no network at all. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ketman https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ketman [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grass_Mud_Horse https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grass_Mud_Horse