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The NSA did its best on INFOSEC back in the days of Walker's Computer Security Initiative: http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-Back-Adde
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
The NSA did its best on INFOSEC back in the days of Walker's Computer Security Initiative:
http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-Back-Addendum.pdf http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-B...
Many systems, under A1 label, were created back then which defeated NSA pentesters. NSA was mainly evaluator rather than developer, but developed some interesting tech of their own. EKMS for key management and especially the inline-media encryptor come to mind. My own IME designs were based on theirs.
https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/inline_media_encryptor/ https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/inline_media_encryptor/
However, most of the developments came from computer science, U.S. military organizations, and defence contractors. They produced a lot of secure technology. People in NSA's IAD helped where possible. Those same methods are used on select systems today although NSA is fast-tracking everything now for some reason at low-assurance. Probably part of BULLRUN.
Anyway, NSA could easily offer good INFOSEC by just applying what's proven to work to various use cases as Bell said. Anyone could. Some did to varying degrees: Sentinel's HYDRA firewall, GEMSOS's thin clients, Mikro-SINA VPN, Secure64's SourceT OS for DNS, and so on. Each of these either had clear security improvements or did vastly better on penetration tests with GEMSOS and HYDRA surviving NSA pentests with much praise from evaluators.
So, people wanting security should just apply what works to every part of the stack. Won't be easy. Will take time. Will probably be incremental. Nonetheless, insecure protocols, monolithic kernels, C libraries... these things have never worked and never will. Just doing the opposite of mainstream in key areas will get one far. Imitating the best of the past will get you really far. And the hardware is the most important battle from there as I said in counterpoint to Dan Geer.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/dan_geer_on_hea.html#c5598568 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/dan_geer_on_h...
So, screw Alexander's outfit. Nobody needs it: just lessons NSA and others taught us long ago plus what we've learned in mean time. So, use them instead and save yourself the consulting fee. You'll need it for the premium that real security costs you. ;)