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"Why target non-belligerent countries?" Worth noting that until not long before the Cuban missile crisis there was only one single unconditional plan for the U
by arethuza 11y ago
"Why target non-belligerent countries?"
Worth noting that until not long before the Cuban missile crisis there was only one single unconditional plan for the US fighting a nuclear war: the first version of SIOP -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_Plan#The_first_SIOP https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_...
This targeted the Soviets, China, Warsaw Pact countries and even the likes of Yugoslavia and Albania. There was an exchange between General Power and David Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, that went as follows:
"What would happen if Beijing was not fighting; was there an option to leave Chinese targets out of the attack plan?" Power was reported to have said that he hoped no one would think of that "because it would really screw up the plan"—that is, the plan was supposed to be executed as a whole. Apparently Shoup then observed that "any plan that kills millions of Chinese when it isn't even their war is not a good plan. This is not the American way."
Edit: For anyone interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis I can strongly recommend "One Minute To Midnight" by Michael Dobbs - it is full of episodes like this (some even more alarming).
- pdeuchler 11y agoTo play devil's advocate that kind of makes sense... in the advent of a nuclear launch you have no idea how other people will respond, and if China et al were to respond it's reasonable to assume it would have been directed at the US (even if the US was not the aggressor). At that point you have to go scorched earth and take out any possible retaliation. It is nuclear war after all, when you're launching an arsenal of 32,000 warheads there's only going to be one survivor at best so you might as well do everything in your power to make sure it's you.
- mikeash 11y agoAmerican military planners don't seem to agree with that, since they revised it later on to add options. It looks more likely that the original all-or-nothing SIOP was just an organizational thing due to limited planning resources available. To make a bad and inadequate analogy, it's like writing a computer program that does a bunch of unnecessary work because it's easier and you want to get it out the door. Except instead of wasted CPU cycles, it's millions of lives.
- scrumper 11y agoI think this is exactly the case. I do remember reading that early versions of SIOP were designed to be easily triggered by a heavily compromised administration after an attack, so there wasn't any real room for options which would require a more complicated and confusing command protocol than just saying, "go". Command and Control (I think) touches on the back-and-forth evolution with SIOP between the various branches of military and civilian leadership.
- arethuza 11y ago"China et al were to respond it's reasonable to assume it would have been directed at the US" China didn't have nuclear weapons until '64 and I have no idea who the leaders of Albania were threatening apart from their own unfortunate population.
- rangibaby 11y agoI think military planners didn't fully understand what it really meant to use nuclear weapons until later. Things like tactical weapons (Davy Crockett, Genie missiles) and non-military (Operation Plowshares and the Soviet equivalent) were developed in the 50s and pretty much gone by the late 60s. Dr. Strangelove (1964) is probably the best documentary you can watch about what "they" thought at the time.
- dchichkov 11y agoIt only makes sense, if you'd put nations and nationalism above everything. "We have heard the rationales offered by the nuclear superpowers. We know who speaks for the nations. But who speaks for the human species? Who speaks for Earth?" - Carl Sagan.
- arbuge 11y agoI always thought Sagan would have been the best spokesman, ironically.
- rtkwe 11y ago"Command and Control" by Eric Schlosser also covers a lot of the close calls and mishaps during the Cold War inside the missile and bomber program. There was a big confluence of technical and policy issues that lead to the inflexible SIOP. First being able to keep target lists up to date and distributing targets to the silos was a big hurdle. Policy wise there was a huge rush to get the SIOP in place so that the looming threat of a Soviet first strike could actually be countered, because without some plan in place the US would be in a huge disarray after the theoretical attack.
- paulmd 11y agoGeneral Power was well-known to be batshit fucking insane. Even General LeMay thought he was unstable and aggressive, and LeMay himself was the guy who oversaw the war against the Japanese Home Islands. When the guy who burned the best part of a million people alive with firebombings and then nuked the remains thinks you're a bit of a loose cannon, well... He is often viewed as the likely inspiration for Gen. Buck Turgidson in the film Dr. Strangelove. A quote from Power, when the RAND Corporation raised the proposal of a counterforce strike instead of striking at Soviet cities: "Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!" In the words of Gen. Horace Wade, a subordinate who served under Gen Powers: I used to worry about General Power. I used to worry that General Power was not stable. I used to worry about the fact that he had control over so many weapons and weapon systems and could, under certain conditions, launch the force. Back in the days before we had real positive control [i.e., PAL locks], SAC had the power to do a lot of things, and it was in his hands, and he knew it. SAC pushed back very strongly against this intrusion. The first Permissive Action Links were installed in 1959 and the bulk of them in 1962, but the 8-digit security codes were set to "0000 0000" until around 1977, because SAC was afraid that they would be unable to fire the weapons if needed. It's a goddamn miracle we didn't go over the edge, either accidentally or with those guys at the controls. In one case, a B-52 crashed in North Carolina in 1961. The bomb went through its full arming sequence, being stopped only by a single low-voltage switch. That switch later became known for being unreliable and failing to interrupt its signal properly. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash The Russians had some close calls of their own, notably when the sun glinted off the clouds and tripped their launch warnings during ABLE ARCHER 83.
- david-given 11y agoPeople interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis may like to read this: http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=65071 http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=... It's an extremely well written and thoroughly researched what-if of what might happen in a Cuban Missile Crisis gone horribly wrong --- and quite thoroughly chilling.