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> automatically support SHA2 for modern browsers and fall back to SHA1 for legacy browsers that don't support SHA2 Doesn't this expose users to downgrade attac
by fulafel 11y ago
> automatically support SHA2 for modern browsers and fall back to SHA1 for legacy browsers that don't support SHA2
Doesn't this expose users to downgrade attack?
- eastdakota 11y agoNot in any way we've been able to think of — and we've spent a lot of time thinking about this and running it by the crypto community. But, if someone can demonstrate such an attack and we can't fix it technically, then we will drop support for the SHA1 fallback. And, on a customer-by-customer basis, we'll allow customer to turn off fallback if they're worried about a theoretical, if undemonstrated, attack.
- yaps8 11y agoCould you elaborate or do you have a source on the technique you use to mitigate downgrade attacks ?
- ryan-c 11y agoNo mitigation is required. Part of the data signed by the server certificate in the handshake is the entire ClientHello message. If a MitM attacker did a downgrade, they would have to change the ClientHello, and then the client would notice that what the server signed does not match what they sent.