4 ms·
My understanding is that this system is trying to solve one particular problem: how can you be sure your vote was counted? A simple visual inspection probably i
by rspeer 11y ago
My understanding is that this system is trying to solve one particular problem: how can you be sure your vote was counted? A simple visual inspection probably isn't enough to convince me that my ballot box won't be dropped off the back of a truck later.
That said, I do have some question about how thoroughly it addresses that problem.
A lot of the presentation is about difficult edge cases, such as how a voter can falsely verify their vote to someone who's coercing them to vote a certain way. This part seems quite complicated, but it kind of has to be. Maybe an interest group could make step-by-step instructions available to groups of voters who they think are likely to be coerced.
What I don't know from the presentation is, is the simple case understandable? If I am a reasonably normal person who has never been to a key-signing party and does not code El Gamal for fun, will I be able to verify my vote? Do I need to personally do the math and computation that would verify my vote, or would there be a usable, trustworthy app of some sort that does it?
Here's another threat model that they don't discuss: what if I don't like this system and I want to undermine it, and I use a false verification code to say "look, you counted my vote for the wrong candidate, this system is corrupt"? Presumably nobody would be able to say I was wrong, and nobody would be able to distinguish a real election flaw from my fictitious one.
- nickbauman 11y agoA ballot box falling off the back of a truck is a voting system problem that us utterly unrelated to the "verifiable voting mechanism" problem. Talking about them in the same sentence this way obscures both problems.
- rspeer 11y agoI mentioned it hyperbolically, as a way of saying a voting system being simple and inspectable is not sufficient to make your vote verifiable.