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I manually worked thru a hypothetical election using Punchscan for my jurisdiction. It didn't protect voter privacy. With paper ballots, dropping your ballot i
by specialist 11y ago
I manually worked thru a hypothetical election using Punchscan for my jurisdiction. It didn't protect voter privacy.
With paper ballots, dropping your ballot into the ballot box is the secure one-way hash (assuming enough people are voting).
The trick crypto systems do is hide your ballot within a herd of ballots, using some kind of one way hash, assuming there will be hash collisions. Works great with simple ballots (few races) and large numbers of voters.
Alas, in my jurisdiction, the smallest political (bookkeeping) unit is a precinct (ranging from 0-1000 voters) and our ballots have 10-40 races. So combinatorially, it's likely each ballot is uniquely identifiable.
A crypto systems might work if our complex ballots were separated into more simple ballots. Eg one each for national, statewide, county, and local races.
Rant: My primary grievance with proponents of crypto for voting is they do not specify under which conditions their systems will and will not protect voter privacy. That is very intellectually dishonest, with a dash of technophilia.
After studying this, extensively, crypto based voting systems for elections are complete non-starter for me. I'd rather forfeit voter privacy than embrace an inscrutable system that I can barely understand.