The A-10 was not a anti-tank panacea. It's survivability was questioned even then, and given what we now know about the threat environment, it's likely it would

The A-10 was not a anti-tank panacea. It's survivability was questioned even then, and given what we now know about the threat environment, it's likely it would have suffered tremendously. [1] Now, in the 1980s, there was a growing idea that it was feasible to stop a conventional attack [2] but this was a new an untested idea. Doctrine still called for tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet bridgeheads as being the only way to assuredly offset the numerical disadvantage. But that's all tactical. Part of the reason there were simply so many warheads built was to account for attrition and failure. There were real concerns about the inability for nuclear weapons to reach their targets. Having 5 bombs did not assuredly mean 5 cities destroyed. Bombers and cruise missiles could be shot down, ballistic missiles intercepted, and submarines sunk. That's not to mention that, with testing (relatively) limited after 1963, there were reliability concerns regarding a weapon's ability to detonate after delivery (especially with regard to shocks.) So the solution for the U.S. and the USSR (others turned to more elaborate means [3]) was to simply throw more warheads, on more platforms, in a variety of ways, to ensure that regardless of whether or not this was a first strike, counterforce, etc, weapons would get through in quantity. This was the "A" in Mutually Assured Destruction. 1. http://baloogancampaign.com/2015/02/02/10-future-us-close-air-support/ http://baloogancampaign.com/2015/02/02/10-future-us-close-ai... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AirLand_Battle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AirLand_Battle 3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevaline https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevaline