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The UK was worried that the US was escalating the Cold War conflict and that we'd be more at risk rather than safer as a result. Given that this was exactly wh
by arethuza 11y ago
The UK was worried that the US was escalating the Cold War conflict and that we'd be more at risk rather than safer as a result.
Given that this was exactly what happened in the late 50s and early 60s (US over estimates Soviet threat for internal political reasons, builds huge arsenals, Soviets scramble to catch up) this is pretty much what happened so their worries were justified.
- Turing_Machine 11y ago"US over estimates Soviet threat for internal political reasons" "Over-estimated" how? I mean, there really was about a 2:1 Warsaw Pact tank advantage, and nuclear deterrence really was the only realistic way of countering it. Can you be more specific about how this threat was "over-estimated"?
- arethuza 11y agoIt's pretty clear that the existence of nuclear weapons deterred political leaders from contemplating war. However, the actual number of weapons in place spiraled vastly beyond what was actually required for deterrence - largely, it has to be said, due to internal US political reasons: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_gap https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_gap https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_gap https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_gap NB I'm in no way defending the Soviets, who were a deeply unpleasant bunch, but I think it's pretty clear that a lot of unnecessary risks were run during the Cold War and the UK would have been one of the worst victims.
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- CapitalistCartr 11y agoNuclear wasn't the only way. We built the A-10 Warthog specifically to counter the tank problem and it filled its role brilliantly. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thun...
- dingaling 11y agoThe A-10 program only survived the 1970s as an anti-tank respin of a Vietnam counter-insurgency specification. The gun was only effective against certain aspects of T-64 armour and only after US Army Cobras had eliminated or reduced ZSU and Gaskin vehicles to allow the A-10 to approach to gun range. What it does very effectively today in close-support was for what it was originally intended, not tank-busting.
- CapitalistCartr 11y agoThe GAU-8 cannon was designed specifically for the anti-tank role using APDU. The A-10 was designed solely for close air support, including attacking tanks as the link I provided mentions. All close air support requires control of the air space.
- ckozlowski 11y agoWhile the gun had been viewed as effective and economical, by the 80's there were real question as to how realistic the A-10s survivability would be. I apologise for not having a link on hand that discusses this, but the standoff requirement to survive in the environment shifted the A-10's primary anti-tank weapon to the AGM-65 Maverick, and not the cannon, soon after it was introduced.
- hga 11y agoThe gun was only effective against certain aspects of T-64 armour Would these be the sides and top? Which an aircraft is in a much better position to attack than troops on the ground facing it's forward armor.
- ckozlowski 11y agoThe A-10 was not a anti-tank panacea. It's survivability was questioned even then, and given what we now know about the threat environment, it's likely it would have suffered tremendously. [1] Now, in the 1980s, there was a growing idea that it was feasible to stop a conventional attack [2] but this was a new an untested idea. Doctrine still called for tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet bridgeheads as being the only way to assuredly offset the numerical disadvantage. But that's all tactical. Part of the reason there were simply so many warheads built was to account for attrition and failure. There were real concerns about the inability for nuclear weapons to reach their targets. Having 5 bombs did not assuredly mean 5 cities destroyed. Bombers and cruise missiles could be shot down, ballistic missiles intercepted, and submarines sunk. That's not to mention that, with testing (relatively) limited after 1963, there were reliability concerns regarding a weapon's ability to detonate after delivery (especially with regard to shocks.) So the solution for the U.S. and the USSR (others turned to more elaborate means [3]) was to simply throw more warheads, on more platforms, in a variety of ways, to ensure that regardless of whether or not this was a first strike, counterforce, etc, weapons would get through in quantity. This was the "A" in Mutually Assured Destruction. 1. http://baloogancampaign.com/2015/02/02/10-future-us-close-air-support/ http://baloogancampaign.com/2015/02/02/10-future-us-close-ai... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AirLand_Battle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AirLand_Battle 3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevaline https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevaline
- mannykannot 11y ago>"Over-estimated" how? Kennedy's missile gap, for one. The existence of a threat does not mean that it cannot be over-estimated.
- gopowerranger 11y agoYou are ignoring the fact that the USSR built up their atomic weaponry, moved in on other countries, and made threats to the US. Your statement is one-sided.