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The problem is fundamentally that the most top-security ever possible is an offline piece of paper locked in a Mission Impossible-resistant bankvault that only
by paulmd 11y ago
The problem is fundamentally that the most top-security ever possible is an offline piece of paper locked in a Mission Impossible-resistant bankvault that only the President has the capability to open.
But then you can't actually use it to do anything and its existence is purely a downside. And you can't put it online - in any fashion - without exposing it to some possibility of compromise. Whether that's by one-or-more sysadmins who take a massive bribe (compromising two decades of SCI-level USG secrets => name a number and we'll pay in Billions), or users who can perform sidechannel attacks, and so on.
Everyone knows what happens once you expose real systems to real users/admins (should be read as "attackers"). You cannot design a black box that miraculously requires no administration and is not vulnerable to any sidechannel attack when your threat category is state-level actors.
I actually suspect the NSA does fall into the category of "altruistic actors" here. Their number-one concern is making sure that nobody can decrypt the things that nobody should be reading. I don't think they're above pulling a kleptographic backdoor if there's a computationally-strong guarantee that nobody else can break it (perhaps while learning a hard lesson about socially-strong security) but at the end of the day I do trust that they won't be broadcasting State Secrets in something that will be publically accessible within a decade.
When dealing with a state actor like the NSA you need to reverse Hanlon's Razor - they may be malicious, but they're not stupid. They know when the jig is up and it's time to cut their losses.