6 ms·
These are mostly moot points. They don't have robots trying millions of passwords on phones. They make an image of the phone's memory and brute force it elsewhe
by beeboop 11y ago
These are mostly moot points. They don't have robots trying millions of passwords on phones. They make an image of the phone's memory and brute force it elsewhere. Even a 6 digit code would be cracked in seconds, at most.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- superuser2 11y agoFalse. The PIN is an input to the onboard HSM, which holds the actual key. The HSM itself enforces rate limiting and, if you have the right setting enabled, wipes its contents after N bad PINs.
- ars 11y agoSo impossible really means impractical. That HSM is still just a physical machine, and it can be, with difficulty, modified or copied. To be impossible it would have to be mathematically impossible (or at least not within human time scales).
- beeboop 11y agoOr emulated, which I am sure is not difficult for NSA.
- ars 11y agoTo emulate you need to copy first.
- zyx321 11y agoYes. Really, REALLY impractical. "Disassemble phone, desolder security module, dissolve the outer layers in hydrochloric acid, cut the silicon into 16nm slices, scan each layer with an electron microscope" impractical.
- marvin 11y ago"In a vaccuum while avoiding all the traps that the HSM maker designed, each of which will physically destroy the key if triggered".
- chris_va 11y agoPhysically interfering with the delay/wipe mechanism should be possible. You only have to build the solution once. I can see that this makes it much harder up front, but eventually this too will get cracked.
- kevinchen 11y agoSince each HSM has a unique key, wouldn't you have to decap one chip for each phone to recover the keys? I think that is sufficient protection to make decrypting phones unfeasibly expensive for most cases.
- superuser2 11y agoIndeed this has been done: someone programmed an RPi/Arduino to cut power to the phone after PIN verification and before the PIN attempt was persisted. This effectively defeated rate limiting and the 10 attempt limit. However I believe that was the 5S, and that seems like a fixable bug (record the PIN attempt before verifying the PIN). Yep, it was patched: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-4451 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-4451
- BCM43 11y agoIs it possible to image the HSM somehow?
- diafygi 11y agoVery very unlikely. Hardware security modules are designed with the explicit purpose to protect secrets, including from physical tampering.
- beeboop 11y agoWhy is it unlikely? It's perfectly plausible to emulate any sort of hardware. What sort of magic sauce does Apple have to make a piece of hardware that can't be replicated and modified?
- ramchip 11y agoHere's an overview of several techniques used to defeat this: https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv2-c16.pdf https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv2-c16.pdf
- superuser2 11y agoA replicated HSM doesn't contain the key that the data is encrypted with. You'd need to modify the HSM that has the right key in it. The point of an HSM is to fight you very, very hard on that front by dumping the key if it detects anything shady.
- vox_mollis 11y agoAnd due to their black-box nature, they are very likely invisibly compromised by the five eyes. Every CEO of a major technology company, including those that manufacture HSMs, is well aware of the lessons taught by Joe Nacchio.
- beeboop 11y agoYou're missing the point. They don't need to input a pin. There's no phone involved in the process at all. They image the memory and put it on some server for processing. If there's an intermediary step, like an HSM, it is not difficult for something like the NSA to emulate.
- achivetta 11y agoYou give the HSM the pin, it returns the key used to encrypt the data, applying the rules to that interaction with you. Emulating the HSM doesn't help since it is that phone's specific HSM with the key it knows that you need to access.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- Laforet 11y agoYou can't. Crypto is done on a separate piece of silicon and dumping memory or NAND will get you nothing but scrambled bits. From a cold boot user data is not loaded into memory until a correct pin has been entered once, and since A5 nobody has managed to compromise their bootchain it is not really viable to exploit either. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-your-iphone.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-app... To break such a system is not impossible, but would require some heroic effort, even nation states would probably resort to some side channel or the proverbial five dollar wrench.
- superuser2 11y agoYou claim the contents of memory are encrypted with a 4-digit PIN; I'm telling you this is false, they're encrypted with a 256-bit key held inside the HSM [0]. It matters because a 4-digit AES key is indeed trivial to crack but a 256-bit key is not. I'm not sure you understand what an HSM is. It doesn't help to "emulate" one. An HSM performs cryptographic operations under certain conditions (such as correct PIN entry) using internally stored keys. The whole point is that you can't get the keys out, only use them. If you had another HSM, or a logical model of one, it wouldn't contain the right keys. Certainly as engineered systems, it's possible for HSMs to contain vulnerabilities, but getting the key out of an HSM is a much more sophisticated task than cracking a keyspace of just 10,000 possibilities. Possible, maybe. [0]http://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf http://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
- 2bitencryption 11y agoNot true -- on newer iPhones this is actually done on dedicated hardware that enforces these limits. It's actually really impressive.
- comex 11y agoWell, given that the Secure Enclave is a processor, I suspect the relevant statement in the whitepaper just means that it's done by software on the SEP rather than the main processor, not that it's done purely by hardware. I could be wrong. But if I'm right, note that the SEP will take firmware upgrades signed with Apple's key, same as the main processor.