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Sorry, but in this case we have a POS terminal accepting a fraudulent PIN because the card device, which could have cryptographically signed that validation, di
by ajross 11y ago
Sorry, but in this case we have a POS terminal accepting a fraudulent PIN because the card device, which could have cryptographically signed that validation, did not because the protocol didn't require it.
That's a fundamentally broken protocol. The hardware capability was there to do this securely, the software design messed up.
Unless what you're saying is that the PIN itself is an "application", in which case your point seems sorta specious. OK, so the application has a broken protocol which invalidates the whole idea of "Chip & PIN" authentication.
- thrownaway2424 11y agoI think we agree. This is a broken application, built upon a sound technology. The card is perfectly capable of signing the transaction, and will only do so if the correct PIN is entered (smart cards can also be programmed to disable themselves after a number of incorrect PIN attempts). However the banks either don't know how to, or do not want to, run a public-key cryptosystem, so they don't ask the card to sign.