3 ms·
Well... in principle the device is supposed to be able to provide an authenticated public key that gets signed by some upstream bank/authority, right? It's the
by ajross 11y ago
Well... in principle the device is supposed to be able to provide an authenticated public key that gets signed by some upstream bank/authority, right? It's the same principle as TLS -- you can trust the site because they have a signed cert.
And this part apparently was unbroken, because the attackers left the initial chip in place and just proxied the PIN response.
So... if you have that, why on earth didn't the protocol specify a two-way kind of thing that allows the already-authenticated card device to sign and return a "I validated that PIN" message, which wouldn't be MitMable?
I'm just stunned that somehow they went through the trouble of putting a !@#!?! computer into every credit card capable of elaborate crypto and then blew this really obvious hole in the middle of it...