> I don't think that running plain text services is warranted So stop the fear mongering over self-signed certs so plaintext can simply end. > while forming t

> I don't think that running plain text services is warranted So stop the fear mongering over self-signed certs so plaintext can simply end. > while forming the mindset of people into a false pretense of security Then stop conflating self-signed certificates with a trust system. I'm talking about a replacement for plaintext; this doesn't affect the handling of authenticated certificates in any way. Since you still seem to not not understand this, let me be explicit: I'm saying we need protect against passive eavesdropping at the network level. I never said you should lie to the use* and claim their connection had any additional security. These fears about a "false pretense of security" are not relevant, as a move from plaintext to opportunistic encryption with self-signed certificates shouldn't be visible to the user. > I cannot trust that the party which I am communicating it is the party I intended to communicate with or that no one else has the key. Obviously. I never claimed otherwise. This isn't relevant, and if you want to protect against this threat model, you obviously need proper authentication (which I recommend whenever possible). Currently a lot communication on the internet has authentication risks AND allows anybody with a packet sniffer to log their data for next to no cost? You to believe it's a bad idea to convert those plaintext situations into something that has the same authentication risks while only betraying the contents to a single eavesdropper, who must be a MitM. There is no technical reason not to do this. As you obviously know because you referenced the certificate warning popup, self-signed certificates are trivially identifiable, so there is no reason to confuse them with normal certificates. Absolutely nothing needs to change in how this is presented to the user, so we aren't creating any sort of false sense of security. > Under those circumstances I will not transfer any information that I would not transfer over plain text period, Good for you. What does that have to do with the fact that much of the internet is still filled with the plaintext of people who don't understand this kind of technical topic? Why are you resisting shielding their communications from passive eavesdropping? This attitude that security must protect against all threats (or at least the treats YOU care about) is a major problem. What do you think is going to happen? It is magical thinking to assume that everyone will suddenly start using full, proper crypto (they can do that right now). We've been trying that for years and the result was a lot of people staying with plaintext.