4 ms·
That's amazing. They were able to MITM the chip-and-pin chip by taking it out and attaching it to another hobbyist chip that's capable of spoofing the response
by kbenson 11y ago
That's amazing. They were able to MITM the chip-and-pin chip by taking it out and attaching it to another hobbyist chip that's capable of spoofing the response, and the whole thing when put back in the card was only a slight bulge bigger than the original.
They say nearly 600k Euros were charged, but given the sophistication of the attack, I wouldn't be surprised if we hear later that it was in use at different locations as well, and we just aren't hearing about it because they haven't caught those people yet. They only caught these ones because they kept going back to the same locations.
- tejaswiy 11y agoIt's a clever hack, but shouldn't people have thought of this before they developed the whole protocol? How can any random chip answer a "true" response to the pin request? Shouldn't it have some sort of authorization built-in? Maybe public / private key with a bunch of implicitly trusted public keys? As I say that, I guess this relies on having a network connection which cannot be assumed when you're developing a POS. Hmm.
- joosters 11y agoYeah, it'd be a huge complication to maintain and update the keys across all the terminals, many of which are not network attached. Plus an attacker could extract a key from the chip (probably hard, due to anti-tampering technology, but not impossible)
- kbenson 11y agoAlthough I'm pretty sure when you are talking about validating a credit card, a network connection is a given. Otherwise how do you authorize or deny the purchase?
- BHSPitMonkey 11y agoMaybe it's a possibility that the POS is networked but the physical card reader hardware is not?
- kbenson 11y agoThe reverse is more likely in the US. There's plenty of old legacy POS systems/registers, which have a card reader that's with it, attached or not. The only way I've ever seen a card run without a network (whether it be an existing network or an integrated modem and phone line), is when there's a power outage and someone busts out one of the old carbon copy manual card machines, where they take an impression of the card. Those may not even be accepted anymore, since they don't deal with CVV numbers and some cards don't even have embossed numbers anymore.
- jessaustin 11y agoDon't keep purchasing at the same merchants; that's like Carder 101! Regardless, this whole "ask the card if the PIN was right" protocol is just dumb. Surely they could have e.g. had the card sign a challenge in a way it could only do if given the right PIN? That gets slightly more complicated when revoking old PINs or issuing new ones, but it would still be possible. For all we heard about the wonders of C'n'P, this seems to fall short. If you're going to the expense of chipping all those cards and replacing all those terminals, at least get the software right.
- kbenson 11y ago> Don't keep purchasing at the same merchants; that's like Carder 101! I know! It's the stupid details and extra people they bring in that seems to eventually get these rings caught. > Surely they could have e.g. had the card sign a challenge in a way it could only do if given the right PIN? Well, the article seemed to imply the chip put in the CC was from a different card, so maybe they know the pin for that chip, and the MITM is really about the authentication of the chip in the wrong card? Later they do seem to imply the fix was to authenticate the chip, but I'm not sure without reading the original paper if that's an over-simplification of what the fix was, and maybe it's better authentication of the chip.
- joosters 11y agoBut the chip is the only part of the communication that knows the PIN. (the protocol does not need a network connection to the bank). The chips could be made to sign their response with a bank's private key and the terminal checks this against a known list of banks. But that would be cumbersome (lots of banks, lots of keys), the terminals would need to be constantly updated to keep the key list up to date, and it all falls apart when a key is extracted out of the chip. Now if the protocol required a network connection to the bank, you could speak to the bank to validate a PIN instead of talking to the chip at all.
- bravo22 11y agoThey signed transaction would indeed fix this issue but it was ignored by the bank (to their detriment) for other reasons. The implementation is actually pretty decent. It doesn't require key management the way you describe it. Banks use a derived key schemes for EMV transactions. In a way you can think of it as PKI. In any event, the actual verification doesn't happen on the terminal. The terminal is supposed to take the signed transaction and pass it up through the network where it will end up with the originating bank who will say "Yes, we accept it", or "No, we don't accept this charge". This is something that happens today but it is the CC# and the CVV that get passed. If they are revealed/stolen you're screwed.
- TeMPOraL 11y agoMakes me wonder if carder community has systems to protect from and/or punish idiots with poor OPSEC. It takes only one such idiot to ruin a perfectly good attack vector.
- kbenson 11y agoMy understanding is that the online forums for this work quite a bit on reputation (for sellers at least). I can imagine people that use these hacks remove themselves from the ecosystem when they get caught. I also imagine the selling of this hack, if it happened, was probably brokered as a unique sale where the seller would not resell the hack, similar to how I imagine a lot of high-end zero-day exploits are sold. This, of course, is where the seller reputation would come into play.