It is exactly crying wolf because AFAIK, okay, cert expiration - you don't have to rekey when you go get a new one, you just get a new one. The benefit seems to

It is exactly crying wolf because AFAIK, okay, cert expiration - you don't have to rekey when you go get a new one, you just get a new one. The benefit seems to be commercial, rather than technical. Name doesn't match: I've encountered a legitimate (as opposed to an obvious misconfiguration) error along these lines precisely zero times in well over a decade. CA untrusted: CA trust is worthless - the browser doesnt differentiate between "the person who holds the cert had control of the domain when we generated it" and "we made sure this person exists and checked their identity". (Unless you jump into the total scam that is EV certs...) Would you kindly stop banging on about "As good as plain text?". because as has been explained to you ad nauseum, in the worst case it becomes you vs one attacker who holds the key to the bogus cert, instead of you vs anyone on the local wifi network. The number of attackers is unbounded in the latter case, QED, it is strictly a better security posture. SSL as it exists today is fine for keeping a hacker out of your connection. It was not designed nor implemented for a post-Snowden world.