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I consider it virtually certain that Pakistani intelligence at some level was specifically hiding bin Laden and probable that the highest levels of government/a
by jcranmer 11y ago
I consider it virtually certain that Pakistani intelligence at some level was specifically hiding bin Laden and probable that the highest levels of government/army either knew or suspected (I personally suspect the latter) that this was the case. Given the instability of the Pakistani state and ISI's known prior flirting with extremists, I find it hard to believe that he was sold out by the government. Said information being inadvertently leaked to a low-level, non-ideologically-aligned functionary is possible, but I don't know the state of affairs in ISI/Pakistan's military well enough to judge its plausibility.
As for cooperation: it's extremely plausible for anyone who is aware of where bin Laden was hiding to choose to do absolutely nothing (and to try to refrain those who aren't aware of that fact to stay the hell away until the dust settles). It's reasonable to infer that various people in the military figured out that the US was going after bin Laden sometime during the raid and decided to pretend nothing was going on. Again, given what's been known about Pakistan's cooperation with terrorists in the past, I'd be more surprised if the US was open to even limited people in Pakistan about what it was about to do--in a choice between "piss off Pakistan" versus "risk bin Laden getting away," the former would be my personal vote and probably those of most US politicians.
Ultimately, that's the problem I have with Hersh's version: it assumes that Pakistan suddenly deciding that bedding with terrorists is too risky is a more likely scenario than Pakistan being too incompetent (or merely unwilling) to stand up against the US making the raid it's been wanting to make for a decade.