3 ms·
There may not be a single person on Hacker News, including Colin, who knows enough to implement ECC safely. Yep. ECC is messy. I don't use it, for the very s
by cperciva 17y ago
There may not be a single person on Hacker News, including Colin, who knows enough to implement ECC safely.
Yep. ECC is messy. I don't use it, for the very simple reason that I wouldn't trust an ECC implementation that I wrote. I might trust DJB's ECC code; but I'd be really uncomfortable with using it unless I had spent at least a few weeks checking it over.
It's got at least as many easy dealbreaker pitfalls as RSA.
s/at least as many/many many more/
You don't need OAEP to make RSA work for signing.
No, but you do need PSS if you want to do things right; and PSS is basically the "natural" translation of OAEP from encryption to signing.
- NateLawson 17y agoI agree. The randomized RSA modes (OAEP and PSS) are preferable to the old constant ones (PKCS #1 v1.5). They are better from a theoretical perspective and also from the fact that the randomization may protect you against an attack even in the face of some (but not all!) implementation flaws. They offer both better theoretical security and defense-in-depth.