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We certainly have to be safe from past attacks, but Schneier's point is that with the government's strategy, that's all we're safe from. It would be a lot bett

by karzeem 17y ago

We certainly have to be safe from past attacks, but Schneier's point is that with the government's strategy, that's all we're safe from. It would be a lot better to use a strategy that defends against all attacks we know to be possible, and not just the ones that have already been tried.

ErrantX 17y ago
It would be a lot better to use a strategy that defends against all attacks we know to be possible, and not just the ones that have already been tried. I dont think that's what he's saying either. Effective security comes way before the departure gate. If that is our main line of defence no amount of security will foil the inevitable. I think what he is saying is we should look on these as successes; ok a guy got onto a plane with explosives. But it was a desperate move, with little chance of working - and it failed. Yet actually it succeeded because now the TSA (and others) are running scared again. It would take a brave politician to turn round and say that this time the system worked. The heightened security meant a desperate mechanism was employed and the "last line of defence" (passengers) were utterly effective.
- karzeem 17y ago
  I phrased my point a little clumsily. What I was trying to say (and what I think we agree Schneier is saying) is that if you know about a type of attack and think that it's a type worth defending against, you shouldn't wait for it to actually happen before you take action. Abdul Mutallab could have used his butt (or other things, like a prosthesis or a wheelchair) to stash the parts necessary to assemble a relatively reliable bomb. That's a known attack type, but we're not defending against it at the security checkpoints. Now that could be a wise decision based on the fact that checking for it is hard and, as you said, "effective security comes way before the departure gate". But if some future terrorist carries out this quite-plausible attack and the government then decides that the TSA should start screening for it, it'll mean they learned nothing from the underwear bomber.
hugh_ 17y ago
Without any suggested strategy that would defend against all possible attacks, though, it's not much of a suggestion. The current strategy may be the best one available. If unreliable two-component powder+syringe underpants bombs are the best option currently available to potential aircraft bombers, then that's definitely something.
- swolchok 17y ago
  The point is that the cost of defending against all possible attacks may very well be too high to be worthwhile. If you argue that this is impossible, consider the extreme case where the cost is equal to our GDP (or an appreciable fraction thereof).

by karzeem 17y ago

ErrantX 17y ago

It would be a lot better to use a strategy that defends against all attacks we know to be possible, and not just the ones that have already been tried. I dont think that's what he's saying either. Effective security comes way before the departure gate. If that is our main line of defence no amount of security will foil the inevitable. I think what he is saying is we should look on these as successes; ok a guy got onto a plane with explosives. But it was a desperate move, with little chance of working - and it failed. Yet actually it succeeded because now the TSA (and others) are running scared again. It would take a brave politician to turn round and say that this time the system worked. The heightened security meant a desperate mechanism was employed and the "last line of defence" (passengers) were utterly effective.

karzeem 17y ago
I phrased my point a little clumsily. What I was trying to say (and what I think we agree Schneier is saying) is that if you know about a type of attack and think that it's a type worth defending against, you shouldn't wait for it to actually happen before you take action. Abdul Mutallab could have used his butt (or other things, like a prosthesis or a wheelchair) to stash the parts necessary to assemble a relatively reliable bomb. That's a known attack type, but we're not defending against it at the security checkpoints. Now that could be a wise decision based on the fact that checking for it is hard and, as you said, "effective security comes way before the departure gate". But if some future terrorist carries out this quite-plausible attack and the government then decides that the TSA should start screening for it, it'll mean they learned nothing from the underwear bomber.

hugh_ 17y ago

Without any suggested strategy that would defend against all possible attacks, though, it's not much of a suggestion. The current strategy may be the best one available. If unreliable two-component powder+syringe underpants bombs are the best option currently available to potential aircraft bombers, then that's definitely something.

swolchok 17y ago
The point is that the cost of defending against all possible attacks may very well be too high to be worthwhile. If you argue that this is impossible, consider the extreme case where the cost is equal to our GDP (or an appreciable fraction thereof).