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I don't think any one with even basic understanding of technology thought that an intelligence agency can't breach their cellphone. You have a GPS receiver, a
by dogma1138 11y ago
I don't think any one with even basic understanding of technology thought that an intelligence agency can't breach their cellphone.
You have a GPS receiver, a microphone, camera, and a data capable modem on you all the time this is pretty much a cold-war era dream come true to those agencies.
Heck the layman is probably more "aware" of this than people with better understanding of technology simply because they do not understand the technical difficulties that might be involved in remotely accessing a mobile device.
As for the Neo900, It's a nice project and it's has been posted on this site many time, but you should have serious doubts about it being any more NSA proof than a burner you pickup at the bargain bin at Walmart. Yes they have all their physical electronically resetable fuses that in theory will allow you to disconnect the modem, and they do some power usage analysis to ensure that the radio is actually off, but still they are using regulated off-the-shelf hardware, if the NSA wan't to break into that phone remotely they'll find a way if they won't have a way in straight of the bat to begin with which is also quite likely.
- drdaeman 11y agoIf the interconnections are limited to the extent said off-the-shelf hardware just can't have privileged access to the other parts of the system, it's safe. That said, it doesn't matter if modem is hacked if it can't do much. Backdooring an MCU so it'd allow access on a secret code from anywhere is surely possible in theory, but it'll be hard to hide the cost of adding such backdoor.
- dogma1138 11y agoThe baseband can be compromised, the SOC can be compromised, the OS can be compromised, the SIM card can be compromised, and more importantly the base station it self can be lawfully and unlawfully accessed. The safe part is in theory, there are only a handful of companies that could actually audit a mobile system in any effective matter pretty much all of them are also the vendors of various mobile interception, tracking, and exploitation solutions. Dealing with any type of security requires you to identify and quantify your threat agents, if your threat agents are a foreign or a national intelligence service of any note i wouldn't bet anything on the N900 nor on any other cellphone. If you ask anyone, layman or expert what is a secure device that the NSA could not hack the only thing that they might come up with is a brick, and i wouldn't even trust that[1]. At best the N900 might give you some reliability that when it's off and when the radio is turned off it's actually off, considering that sleep mode power consumption can vary by quite a bit in the same SOC based on conditions like temperature it wouldn't surprise me if you could fool that as well. [1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thing_(listening_device) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thing_(listening_device)
- drdaeman 11y agoEverything can be backdoored, but what about costs? If the interconnection between the baseband and SoC is restricted in a way baseband can't just do DMA requests and mess with the system, the compromised baseband has to talk to the the compromised SoC to compromise the OS. NSA have to either develop a specific backdoor for a specific device (or, better say, schematically similar devices group) and hook into their supply chain (hmmmm...), or develop a quite cost-adding generic backdoor system. They surely have resources to design anything and even beyond that, but added cost to the production just can't be easy to conceal. There must be some sane limit to NSA's possible omnipotence. And then there are reverse engineers who love to peek what's done in silicon. NSA has to shut up not only original part vendor (easy for them, sure), but a bunch of engineers around the world, stealing designs for the chips so they'd make a clone. You know, some countries are famous for that stuff. Add: as for base stations - they're outside the phone. We don't consider plaintext data outside to be secure. If you're about the voice calls - E2E-encrypted VoIP to the rescue.
- dogma1138 11y agoThe cost is irrelevant, the NSA doesn't calculate how much it would cost them to tap Bob's phone, but how much it would hypothetically cost them if they couldn't. Considering from the NSA exploit catalog we've seen that they target very specific and niche devices I don't think they care about scale when it's not possible. Yes the base band doesn't have DMA since it's connected over USB but it still wouldn't trust it if my life would depend on it in even the slightest of ways. For all we know the baseband and all basebands are compromised to the point where the NSA can tap into them DMA or not, there might be some undocumented remote debugging interface that opens a serial connection to the baseband over cellular, there could be a 1000's other things. And while USB does not support DMA it still doesn't mean it's safe by any means, attack over USB can still happen. As for NSA's omnipotence, yes there is a limit to it, but that limit won't be reached by a group of engineers building a phone with commercial off-the-shelf hardware and open source software. If the NSA's reach could be that easy to defeat than they would be very very bad at their jobs, in fact a simple commercial device like this that some how even remotely limits their ability to task their targets would be a reason to shake the NSA up completely and light a fire under their asses because they've been sleeping on the job. But as we all know they aren't sleeping on their job, in fact they act like a bunch of hyper intelligent teenagers on adderall, the NSA and their counter parts shown us for the past 70 years that no system, no network, no form of communication device is safe from them, that's their job, doesn't mean that they should have the mandate to do it all the time, but if they can't they aren't fulfilling their role.