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The thing that scares me is anything which eliminates the fissile isotope production as a step. Everything else is essentially trivial and could probably be do
by rdl 11y ago
The thing that scares me is anything which eliminates the fissile isotope production as a step. Everything else is essentially trivial and could probably be done covertly or brazenly by a state or even a well resourced non-state actor.
Fission-free fusion is probably not realistic at this point (but, if it were developed, would be terrifying), but I think the technology curve for some form of laser isotope separation is disconnected from "special nuclear stuff" and much more "advances in mainstream science.
I'm completely amazed there hasn't been an openly documented theft of either nuclear materials or weapons and subsequent nuclear declaration by a new state or non-state. It seemed self-evident that would happen post-USSR collapse. I suspect some combination of luck and extremely good work by the IC in both Russia and non-Russia had a lot to do with that. Plus, the states most likely to want the weapons already had other pathways, although it's always possible something like the Pakistani or NK or Iranian program "launders" stolen material through some other more overt pipeline, using a "completely working, honest" enrichment process to cover for it. But the isotopic mixes are identifiable, so we'd know once they detonated where material came from.
- mjklin 11y agoThe book The Nuclear Bazaar made the point that the ex-Soviet guards of nuclear material are unusually devoted to their missions, even without pay. Also, the roads in those areas suck so transporting any material covertly would be a challenge to say the least.
- gizmo686 11y agoHow difficult would it be to obscure the isotopic mix, either through running it through a purification process that is not effective enough to get weapons grade from raw ore in a reasonable timeframe, or by mixing in small amounts of un or underpurrified ore.
- derefr 11y ago> I'm completely amazed there hasn't been an openly documented theft of either nuclear materials or weapons and subsequent nuclear declaration by a new state or non-state. I have a feeling that, given the way that both suicides and bank heists increase when they get talked about in the news, no government wants thefts of fissile material talked about, lest the news that one state was successful once embolden other states to try for themselves.
- sanxiyn 11y agoIn 2004, South Korea self-reported enrichment of uranium to weapon grade using laser isotope separation. It seems that nobody suspected it before self-reporting. This was a blatant NPT violation, but IAEA decided against pursuing formal charge, due to political considerations. More here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_nuclear_research_programs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_nuclear_research_...
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- varjag 11y ago> I'm completely amazed there hasn't been an openly documented theft of either nuclear materials or weapons and subsequent nuclear declaration by a new state or non-state. It seemed self-evident that would happen post-USSR collapse. Your gut feeling is right, but it (possibly) happened before the Soviet collapse. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apollo_Affair https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apollo_Affair
- saboot 11y ago> The thing that scares me is anything which eliminates the fissile isotope production as a step. Why do you think we invest in NIF and other fusion projects?
- arethuza 11y agoUsing a fission primary to compress and heat fuel to create fusion is probably, in the context of a weapon, easier, smaller and cheaper than anything remotely like the NIF.
- rdl 11y agoTo do testing after CBT (validating models), fundamental research, and to a lesser extent, fusion power research. (Well, the primary reason is to spend money.)
- rdl 11y ago(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT, not CBT)