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Richard Rhodes' "The Making Of The Atomic Bomb" is a pretty thorough account of the whole enterprise, and concludes that the Germans were nowhere near, so I don

Richard Rhodes' "The Making Of The Atomic Bomb" is a pretty thorough account of the whole enterprise, and concludes that the Germans were nowhere near, so I don't think this is a particularly controversial revelation.

sandworm101 11y ago
It is controversial for those people who hang their hat on the concept that America was in some sort of race to build and use the bomb before the enemy used it against America. No serious historian thinks that was ever a factor once the logistics were apparent, but the History channel still pumps out constant "documentaries" about Nazi superweapons about be deployed had the war lasted another week or two.
- hga 11y ago
  Per e.g. the facts that Rhodes lays out, if the Germans had not screwed up organizationally, had not incorrectly dismissed graphite as a moderator for natural uranium reactors, they might have succeeded with the plutonium path. The fear was legitimate, and per Groves in Now It Can Be Told (he was in charge of counterintelligence), it took us a long time and quite some distance into Western Europe to be fairly confident they weren't doing it. So, no, not the last week, not even 1945, but indeed for a long time.
  - sandworm101 11y ago
    They might have nailed down the science, but not the efforts necessary to gather the fissile material. And then, even if they did have the resources, actually doing all that so close to the action and with the risk of bombing by air or spies, would be inconceivable. The american, actually the canadian-american project as that's where the uranium came from, had the advantage of vast open spaces well outside the range of any enemy aircraft.
    - hga 11y ago
      the efforts necessary to gather the fissile material That's what the plutonium path is all about. It doesn't require a lot, and between the uranium ore from Africa they got when the captured Belgium, and the not as rich ore from Czechoslovakia, it was judged it might be enough. You say it's "inconceivable", but it was indeed "conceived", considered to be possible, if perhaps unlikely, by lots of scientists and engineers working on the Manhattan Project. Who as it progressed had a better and better idea of exactly what was required. And who knew how long we dicked around with the concept before committing to it, and then putting Groves in charge. There's also the danger of 20/20 hindsight. For example, the critical March 1940 Frisch–Peierls memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frisch%E2%80%93Peierls_memorandum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frisch%E2%80%93Peierls_memoran...) laid out the scientific path to success (fast fission) and estimated about 1 kg (2.2 lb) of U-235 was required. Later it was learned it was 52 kg, and plutonium-239 a much more modest 10 kg. Suppose the universe instead allowed 1 pound of Pu-239? Is that still "inconceivable"? Was the V-2 effort "inconceivable"? It required a similar order of magnitude of effort, we knew more about the project because they had to test fly it, the threat was obvious and it did cause a lot of harm, and yet the "risk by air" was not enough to take it out prior to that harm. The final detail is that even if low priority (you're not going to convince many it was truly impossible), the consequences of their getting it before it was too late for the Third Reich were ... well, it would have been existential for them.
      - hga 11y ago
        Oops, critical typo in last sentence: The final detail is that even if low probability (you're not going to convince many it was truly impossible), the consequences of their getting it before it was too late for the Third Reich were ... well, it would have been existential for them.
  - tsotha 11y ago
    This. What mattered from the standpoint of US decision making wasn't what the Germans were actually doing, but rather what the US leadership thought the Germans were doing.
    - deleted 11y ago
      [deleted]
    - hga 11y ago
      Or more specifically, from an intelligence viewpoint, what the Germans could be doing. Intent was well established when Hitler declared war on us (big mistake), but before that always comes capabilities. They had the uranium (something that Japan never had), they had the industrial capability for the plutonium path (ditto), and they most certainly had the scientists (even after chasing all their Jews away). If they'd gotten serious about it sufficiently earlier than we did....
jewbacca 11y ago
My favourite account of the German nuclear programs (note: using the plural here is deliberate, and significant) is "Hitler's Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall" (http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Uranium-Club-Secret-Recordings/dp/0387950893 http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Uranium-Club-Secret-Recordings...), by physicist Jeremy Bernstein. The centrepiece is a curated set of transcripts from secret recordings of the candid conversations of a group of German scientists detained together for months after the war (specifically for the purpose of surveilling such conversations). Some vaguely YC-ish lessons on how their failure to produce could be attributed in many ways to seemingly mundane organizational structures that were debatably inherent to Nazi German society and internal politics. Also some borderline pornographic payoff when they find out about Hiroshima. At the time, they were convinced they were 10 years ahead of anyone else, and were being detained as a prelude to being showered with honours and put in place to bring American and British science into the modern age. Then they set about convincing themselves they failed on purpose for moral reasons.
- hga 11y ago
  Some related terrible bad luck (well, for the Third Reich) in organization: the scientists' saving throw to get serious resources devoted to the project was ruined when a secretary preparing the invitations for a seminar accidentally substituted the agenda for a highly technical one happening around the same time, and the major figures who would have otherwise shown up declined.

sandworm101 11y ago

It is controversial for those people who hang their hat on the concept that America was in some sort of race to build and use the bomb before the enemy used it against America. No serious historian thinks that was ever a factor once the logistics were apparent, but the History channel still pumps out constant "documentaries" about Nazi superweapons about be deployed had the war lasted another week or two.

hga 11y ago
Per e.g. the facts that Rhodes lays out, if the Germans had not screwed up organizationally, had not incorrectly dismissed graphite as a moderator for natural uranium reactors, they might have succeeded with the plutonium path. The fear was legitimate, and per Groves in Now It Can Be Told (he was in charge of counterintelligence), it took us a long time and quite some distance into Western Europe to be fairly confident they weren't doing it. So, no, not the last week, not even 1945, but indeed for a long time.
- sandworm101 11y ago
  They might have nailed down the science, but not the efforts necessary to gather the fissile material. And then, even if they did have the resources, actually doing all that so close to the action and with the risk of bombing by air or spies, would be inconceivable. The american, actually the canadian-american project as that's where the uranium came from, had the advantage of vast open spaces well outside the range of any enemy aircraft.
  - hga 11y ago
    the efforts necessary to gather the fissile material That's what the plutonium path is all about. It doesn't require a lot, and between the uranium ore from Africa they got when the captured Belgium, and the not as rich ore from Czechoslovakia, it was judged it might be enough. You say it's "inconceivable", but it was indeed "conceived", considered to be possible, if perhaps unlikely, by lots of scientists and engineers working on the Manhattan Project. Who as it progressed had a better and better idea of exactly what was required. And who knew how long we dicked around with the concept before committing to it, and then putting Groves in charge. There's also the danger of 20/20 hindsight. For example, the critical March 1940 Frisch–Peierls memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frisch%E2%80%93Peierls_memorandum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frisch%E2%80%93Peierls_memoran...) laid out the scientific path to success (fast fission) and estimated about 1 kg (2.2 lb) of U-235 was required. Later it was learned it was 52 kg, and plutonium-239 a much more modest 10 kg. Suppose the universe instead allowed 1 pound of Pu-239? Is that still "inconceivable"? Was the V-2 effort "inconceivable"? It required a similar order of magnitude of effort, we knew more about the project because they had to test fly it, the threat was obvious and it did cause a lot of harm, and yet the "risk by air" was not enough to take it out prior to that harm. The final detail is that even if low priority (you're not going to convince many it was truly impossible), the consequences of their getting it before it was too late for the Third Reich were ... well, it would have been existential for them.
    - hga 11y ago
      Oops, critical typo in last sentence: The final detail is that even if low probability (you're not going to convince many it was truly impossible), the consequences of their getting it before it was too late for the Third Reich were ... well, it would have been existential for them.
- tsotha 11y ago
  This. What mattered from the standpoint of US decision making wasn't what the Germans were actually doing, but rather what the US leadership thought the Germans were doing.
  - deleted 11y ago
    [deleted]
  - hga 11y ago
    Or more specifically, from an intelligence viewpoint, what the Germans could be doing. Intent was well established when Hitler declared war on us (big mistake), but before that always comes capabilities. They had the uranium (something that Japan never had), they had the industrial capability for the plutonium path (ditto), and they most certainly had the scientists (even after chasing all their Jews away). If they'd gotten serious about it sufficiently earlier than we did....

jewbacca 11y ago

My favourite account of the German nuclear programs (note: using the plural here is deliberate, and significant) is "Hitler's Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall" (http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Uranium-Club-Secret-Recordings/dp/0387950893 http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Uranium-Club-Secret-Recordings...), by physicist Jeremy Bernstein. The centrepiece is a curated set of transcripts from secret recordings of the candid conversations of a group of German scientists detained together for months after the war (specifically for the purpose of surveilling such conversations). Some vaguely YC-ish lessons on how their failure to produce could be attributed in many ways to seemingly mundane organizational structures that were debatably inherent to Nazi German society and internal politics. Also some borderline pornographic payoff when they find out about Hiroshima. At the time, they were convinced they were 10 years ahead of anyone else, and were being detained as a prelude to being showered with honours and put in place to bring American and British science into the modern age. Then they set about convincing themselves they failed on purpose for moral reasons.

hga 11y ago
Some related terrible bad luck (well, for the Third Reich) in organization: the scientists' saving throw to get serious resources devoted to the project was ruined when a secretary preparing the invitations for a seminar accidentally substituted the agenda for a highly technical one happening around the same time, and the major figures who would have otherwise shown up declined.