> And if we focused on cutting back sentence lengths, maybe that would weaken DAs’ bargaining power at plea bargaining, but since people aren’t serving the mass

> And if we focused on cutting back sentence lengths, maybe that would weaken DAs’ bargaining power at plea bargaining, but since people aren’t serving the massively long sentences anyway, it probably won’t have that big an effect on prison population either. So Mr. Pfaff believes that overzealous DAs have caused the prison population to skyrocket, but quickly dismisses the one proposal that could actually help solve the problem. This seems like a classic case of "My answer, and only my answer, is correct. All other answers are wrong, even if they are compatible with my answer." > You can’t necessarily go to Washington and say, ‘Here’s the law that’s going to control what the DAs do,’ because they don’t have to listen to the federal government at all." Yes, you can. Getting rid of ridiculously long mandatory sentences will make a DA sound a lot less convincing when he threatens the defendant to accept a plea bargain or else. If fewer defendants accept plea bargains, the DA will have to go to trial more often, which costs a lot of time and money. This gives DAs a strong incentive not to charge too many people. There is no justice in a legal system where one side is free to threaten the other side to waive their Constitutional right to a day in court. I don't think we will ever achieve perfect equality of bargaining power between the state and an individual citizen, but tweaking the incentive structure in this way would be a promising first step toward reducing that gap.