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TL;DR: Man who's devoted his life to woolly thinking, thinks about things in a woolly fashion. Note 1 "If we are embedded in a reality that can be beyond our

TL;DR: Man who's devoted his life to woolly thinking, thinks about things in a woolly fashion. Note 1 "If we are embedded in a reality that can be beyond our reach, how can we hope to achieve any knowledge at all? Perhaps Kant was right, and what we think we know may simply reflect the categories of the human mind. We can perhaps only deal with things as they appear to us. How things are in themselves may forever be beyond our grasp. Alternatively, the reality that we seek to understand may not even be subject to rational understanding. It may be sufficiently chaotic and disordered to be unintelligible." Note 2 "There is such a thing as scientific progress, and it happens through systematic trial and error or, in Karl Popper’s terminology, conjecture and refutation. A "scientific realist" has to be wary, though, about how such realism is defined. A realism that makes reality what contemporary science says it is links reality logically to the human minds of the present day. Science is then just a human product, rooted in time and place. Bringing in future science - or ideal science - may sound more plausible, but even then there is a distinction between science reflecting (or corresponding to) the nature of reality and it being simply a human construction." That's the problem with the article, and a lot of Trigg's ideas. He assumes that "science is done by people", "people are flawed", ergo "the output of science is flawed". Which is obviously false, like saying science done by people who speak different languages would express itself differently. However you analyse the structure of an atom is irrelevant to its structure: it is what it is. Sine qua non. There's something which is an atom, whatever you call it and however you discover it. The postulate that "the universe my not be ultimately understandable" should only be taken as a priori at the point where it appears that that is in fact the case. Which it doesn't. (Don't confuse this as a dismissal of uncertainty - that certainly exists, but even that lack of certainty can be expressed in certain terms and understood). Editing for clarity: By "the output of science is flawed" - I phrased this poorly. I don't mean that the interpretation of results is flawed, which it obviously can be. See phlogiston, early models of the solar system and so on. Rather, I meant that he seems to imply that the nature of what's being studied can change given the human looking at it and their understanding. Which isn't correct. Whether you understand how the solar system works or not makes no impact on what it's doing or why it's doing it. I'd have been more accurate to say "the eventual output of the scientific process, upon where it has arrived at the correct answer, is flawed".

chestervonwinch 11y ago
> He assumes that "science is done by people", "people are flawed", ergo "the output of science is flawed". I didn't read this anywhere in the article, nor did I feel it was implied. He is simply arguing that statements about the capability of science must be made outside of science, and that objective reality is independent of the method of discovery (science). I see nothing controversial about this. > The postulate that "the universe my not be ultimately understandable" should only be taken as a priori at the point where it appears that that is in fact the case. Which it doesn't. I'm not sure this should be taken as an axiom, but rather could be a characteristic inherent of the system (à la Gödel's theorems).
- super_mario 11y ago
  Really? There is no objective reality out there. It makes no sense to talk about reality independent of the physical model. Classical science is based on the belief that there exists a real external world whose properties are definite and independent of the observer who perceives them. According to classical science, certain objects exist and have physical properties, such as speed and mass, that have well-defined values. In this view our theories are attempts to describe those objects and their properties, and our measurements and perceptions correspond to them. Both observer and observed are parts of a world that has an objective existence, and any distinction between them has no meaningful significance. In other words, if you see a herd of zebras fighting for a spot in the parking garage, it is because there really is a herd of zebras fighting for a spot in the parking garage. All other observers who look will measure the same properties, and the herd will have those properties whether anyone observes them or not. In philosophy that belief is called realism. Though realism may be a tempting viewpoint what we know about modern physics makes it a difficult one to defend. For example, according to the principles of quantum physics a particle has neither a definite position nor a definite velocity unless and until those quantities are measured by an observer. It is therefore not correct to say that a measurement gives a certain result because the quantity being measured had that value at the time of the measurement. In fact, in some cases individual objects don’t even have an independent existence but rather exist only as part of an ensemble of many.

chestervonwinch 11y ago

> He assumes that "science is done by people", "people are flawed", ergo "the output of science is flawed". I didn't read this anywhere in the article, nor did I feel it was implied. He is simply arguing that statements about the capability of science must be made outside of science, and that objective reality is independent of the method of discovery (science). I see nothing controversial about this. > The postulate that "the universe my not be ultimately understandable" should only be taken as a priori at the point where it appears that that is in fact the case. Which it doesn't. I'm not sure this should be taken as an axiom, but rather could be a characteristic inherent of the system (à la Gödel's theorems).

super_mario 11y ago
Really? There is no objective reality out there. It makes no sense to talk about reality independent of the physical model. Classical science is based on the belief that there exists a real external world whose properties are definite and independent of the observer who perceives them. According to classical science, certain objects exist and have physical properties, such as speed and mass, that have well-defined values. In this view our theories are attempts to describe those objects and their properties, and our measurements and perceptions correspond to them. Both observer and observed are parts of a world that has an objective existence, and any distinction between them has no meaningful significance. In other words, if you see a herd of zebras fighting for a spot in the parking garage, it is because there really is a herd of zebras fighting for a spot in the parking garage. All other observers who look will measure the same properties, and the herd will have those properties whether anyone observes them or not. In philosophy that belief is called realism. Though realism may be a tempting viewpoint what we know about modern physics makes it a difficult one to defend. For example, according to the principles of quantum physics a particle has neither a definite position nor a definite velocity unless and until those quantities are measured by an observer. It is therefore not correct to say that a measurement gives a certain result because the quantity being measured had that value at the time of the measurement. In fact, in some cases individual objects don’t even have an independent existence but rather exist only as part of an ensemble of many.