11 ms·

This is a problem with antimatter CRLs (so called because the CRL is like antimatter: it wanders around, annihilating a cert only if it encounters it). Rather

by zeveb 11y ago

This is a problem with antimatter CRLs (so called because the CRL is like antimatter: it wanders around, annihilating a cert only if it encounters it). Rather than sending out revocation lists, agents should be forced to renew their certificates regularly. Store a small trusted base in-memory (perhaps one trust root per nation-state), and then use certificate chains to authenticate. Fortunately, there's already a precedent for a credential one needs to renew from the government in order to operate a vehicle: a license plate. Heck, one could avoid the whole problem by doing what the government could have one do with one's license plates in case of accident: turn 'em in.

ansible 11y ago
The architecture you propose sounds better that what's currently being implemented. Now the problem is going to be educating the public that they are directly responsible for their "license transponder" too, and that they need to be really careful with it in the case of an accident or at other times when the car is out of their possession.
- zeveb 11y ago
  > The architecture you propose sounds better that what's currently being implemented. Thanks. It's not actually my idea—it dates back to the mid-1990s, and the work done on RFCs 2692 & 2693. Our industry's failure to seriously adopt their framework is one of the more damning indictments of our maturity which I can think of right now.