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This works because you trust the HTML provider (as a source of a valid hash) but not the CDN. If you don't trust your ISP then getting trusted hashes becomes mo
by matt_heimer 11y ago
This works because you trust the HTML provider (as a source of a valid hash) but not the CDN. If you don't trust your ISP then getting trusted hashes becomes more interesting. You'd need an encrypted/unmodifiable connection to a 3rd party repository of hashes for HTTP content but that'd only work for shared identical content (like the stuff in a CDN). For personalized content (any website with a login) you need a personalized hash, an HTTPS response could have a header with a hash (RFC 3230: Instance Digests in HTTP) but you can only trust that if you trust HTTPS and if you trust HTTPS then what does the header really add? You probably need two ISPs or at least VPNs if you want to start detecting tampering by an ISP.
- ihsw 11y agoThe idea is to provide protection even in HTTP-only environments (as HTTP is enforced in some places). It would add overhead to verify hashes in the manner that you have mentioned but I think it's worth it.