I think the model is: You can (A) get financial advice that is paid for through nontransparent kickbacks that are paid out of overpriced mutual fund fees, or (B

I think the model is: You can (A) get financial advice that is paid for through nontransparent kickbacks that are paid out of overpriced mutual fund fees, or (B) get financial advice that is transparently paid for by you. When I put it like that, you, the sophisticated reader, would probably choose option B. (Or you'd self-advise and buy index funds, like I do, though I certainly do not recommend that you take financial advice from me.) But it does seem possible that transparent fees would turn some people off to retirement advice -- and, perhaps, to retirement saving -- entirely, since people are more likely to consume free ("free") products than expensive ones. It's also possible that saving an adequate amount in an overpriced underperforming mutual fund is a better outcome than saving an inadequate amount, or nothing, in a low-priced index fund. Both of these are distinctly sub-optimal, of course, and I tend to sympathize with the idea that retirement brokers should be fiduciaries, but I don't think it's quite as easy as Batchelder and Bernstein make it out to be. (From http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-30/spinoffs-kickbacks-and-arbitrage http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-30/spinoffs-ki...)