4 ms·
Thomas is the security consultant, I sell bingo cards to 60 year old women, take with appropriate grains of salt: the timing attack is impractical against almos
by patio11 17y ago
Thomas is the security consultant, I sell bingo cards to 60 year old women, take with appropriate grains of salt: the timing attack is impractical against almost all Django installations, and is difficult to exploit Internet-wide in an automated fashion (like, e.g., you can do for Wordpress vulnerabilities).
However, the impact is probably severe if your installation is vulnerable (i.e. if the bad guy can get sufficiently local access to your site over the network, and if you allow him sufficient rejected attempts). This can happen in plausible circumstances. For example, if you host on Slicehost and the bad guy is sufficiently motivated to pay $20 a month and buy himself a slice in your data center, congratulations, it is highly likely you are vulnerable to timing attacks in this manner. (This vulnerability is by no means unique to Slicehost, I'm just using this as a practical example of how a dedicated adversary can plausibly exploit a common deployment scenario.)
If you're vulnerable, the bad guy can compromise signatures given a long enough time. I am not a Django guy but I am a Rails guy, and one common pattern we have is to store things in the session where the session is serialized into the cookie. For example, we might store the authenticated user_id there. (I do.) The signing is what keeps someone from swapping out user_id = 12387 (their freebie account) for user_id = 1 (my all-powerful admin account) and convincing the system that the user logged into their browser is me. If you can forge a signature, free admin for you.
Given that this vulnerability has catastrophic consequences for vulnerable users and you probably encourage coding practices which make users vulnerable to it, I'd put it pretty high on my list of things to fix prior to release. But again, I am not the security guy.
- brown9-2 17y agoI think that the issue is compounded here by the fact that Django is a framework which will be used in hundreds or thousands (or more) of applications deployed all over the world. Any security issue with the framework itself instantly puts thousands of apps at risk. If you have a single app then you can discount this kind of attack, but when you are producing code that will be used in thousands of other apps, it would be irresponsible to do so.
- tptacek 17y agoI think a feature that is catastrophically insecure when deployed at Slicehost is pretty much D.O.A. anywhere, and that Patrick explained it nicely. I'm sorry for being glib, but something about this Django request rubbed me the wrong way. I get the impression (probably unjustified) that tomorrow the dev team is going to say, "well, that timing problem was the only thing anyone found, so we're good to go". In fact, if they're serious about peer review, the fact that it took 15 seconds to find a critical vulnerability would be a good reason to hold it back for many weeks and to ensure that several competent people signed off on it. I'm conflicted though, because every other mainstream framework has this functionality, and it's not that complicated to build. I wish they'd stop advertising goofy security "features" like "salts" and key rotation, though.
- simonw 17y agoI'm sorry I rubbed you the wrong way - that certainly wasn't my intention. We're serious about peer review. We want to get this right.
- jacobian 17y agoWe've not checked this in yet precisely because, as you say, that good review is important. We don't have anyone in our core community who's a security expert, so that's precisely why we've tried to reach out to the broader web development community for review. I'm really sorry that the request rubbed you the wrong way. In fact, it completely sucks: you're pretty much the perfect kind of person we wanted to interest in this. So on a meta level, do you have any suggestions about how to word or structure requests like this in the future? Can you clarify what, exactly, rubbed you the wrong way? Is there something different we should/could have done? Your main suggestion here seems to be that we give it some time (right?) and I hear that loud and clear. I agree it'd be silly to call for a review on Monday and check it in on Thursday. We've always been a pretty conservative bunch of committers; our community's pretty used to waiting while features get the review they deserve. The problem is that there's a chicken and egg situation with any code that's not committed (or is out on a branch). The vast majority of contributors (let alone developers) only see what's on trunk, so anything that's not yet there gets a simply pitiful number of eyes on it. Once something's committed/merged, a whole lot more people see it (which is why we always end up finding bugs in "stable" code only after it's merged). But shipping insecure code is just awful. As a maintainer, it's hard for me to tell whether a lack of feedback indicates a lack of issues or a lack of interest. Regardless: thanks for your help and advice. I really appreciate it.