4 ms·
There is still the issue of trust on first use. Unless the domain is preloaded in the browser as HSTS there is no assurance that there won't be at least one HT
by McRask 11y ago
There is still the issue of trust on first use. Unless the domain is preloaded in the browser as HSTS there is no assurance that there won't be at least one HTTP request.
- toomuchtodo 11y agohttps://hstspreload.appspot.com/ https://hstspreload.appspot.com/ Took five minutes to configure the preload directive for HSTS in our nginx headers and submit our domain.
- pas 11y agoDNSSEC, TLS DANE is the proper solution for this.
- MichaelGG 11y agoDNSSEC means creating irrevocable CAs that'd be under essentially-direct control of major governments. No thanks. At least with the current system, if a CA fails to act proper, they can get smacked back. With DNSSEC, if .com starts issuing *.com certs, there's no recourse.
- pas 11y agoHuh? Your site can be already completely hijacked by the same actors. Your browser trusts a lot of CAs so VeriSign (or whoever operates the .com zone) can already issue .com certs. And your only hope is to preload your cert (which is a Chrome only thing, and pretty inefficient and inflexible). The Convergence Project with notaries is an even better solution. But using the DNS as the authoritative source of data and using external parties to keep an eye on that would both lead to efficiency (performance, flexibility) and security (as in from the State).
- aianus 11y agoNo, Namecoin is the proper solution to this. DNSSEC is not safe: 1. It requires centralized trust which can be exploited by governments. 2. It still leaves your domain and PKI in the hands of incompetent rent-seeking registrars who can and do get socially engineered all the time.