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> I'm not clear on how Bitcode changes this, apart from expanding the already huge attack surface of the app store. Code execution inside app store servers is a
by mintplant 11y ago
> I'm not clear on how Bitcode changes this, apart from expanding the already huge attack surface of the app store. Code execution inside app store servers is already game over for end-user privacy, isn't it?
I think the point is that it would be harder to detect if this happened, as, with Bitcode, the author loses the ability to compare binaries downloaded from the App Store to those produced by Xcode on their machine.
> FairPlay encryption already made it really difficult for developers to make sure that Apple distributes the build you think they are distributing. But at least, with jailbroken iPhone, I’m currently able to get some idea of what the binary I’m distributing looks like and compare it to the one I submitted to Apple.
- tptacek 11y agoNo, they lose one naive way of performing that comparison. But even stipulating that you're right, this still doesn't make sense. The argument here is that someone with control over Apple's code distribution infrastructure could not, in the absence of an all-bitcode submission system, surreptitiously backdoor iOS apps. But of course, there's a million ways Apple (or someone who owns up Apple) can backdoor apps in ways that don't alter the app binaries themselves directly at all.
- mintplant 11y agoTrue - I missed the "expanding" part of your comment the first time I read it.