Please note that the attack already shown in http://www.ijiss.org/ijiss/index.php/ijiss/article/view/58/pdf_17 http://www.ijiss.org/ijiss/index.php/ijiss/articl

Please note that the attack already shown in http://www.ijiss.org/ijiss/index.php/ijiss/article/view/58/pdf_17 http://www.ijiss.org/ijiss/index.php/ijiss/article/view/58/p... in “Section 4 Security & Efficiency of CryptDB” in March 2014. It basically says that “First of all, CryptDB is open to frequency attack where the adversary knows the frequency of the plaintext. Namely, if the RND layer is decrypted to the DET layer in EQ onion, then the frequency attack is possible to apply because of deterministic encryption in the DET layer. In this attack, the adversary that observes the queries can determine the ciphertext simply by looking at the results’ row count. This attack can only be fixed by the RND layer, which has no usable functionality in practice. For example, assume that we have left part of Table 11, and its encrypted form is the right part in Table 11. By using the knowledge of the frequency, one can learn the corresponding plaintexts from the right encrypted part in Table 11. This issue can be solved easily by using random IV based symmetric encryption, however, this will prevent executing all queries.“ You only apply the real medical data to show its practicality.