4 ms·

while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not wit

by kareemm 17y ago

while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive. The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc). The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097_puff12.html http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...). Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society. source? America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system. source? --- In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time. El Al security at LAX consisted of: * the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/ http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/), * being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article, * LAX (TSA) security, and * El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly) I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable. There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-numbers_x.htm http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp). The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseID=1041 http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...). Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack. I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out? It sure beats: a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports, b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again [edit: fixed list spacing]

intellectronica 17y ago
My source for Israel is my impressions as someone who grew up in Israel, flew through Tel-Aviv many times (last time this morning) and had quite a few friends who worked in airport security. I think it's quite reliable. My source of the TSA is just my impressions from travelling from the US, so it's probably not that reliable.
ghshephard 17y ago
El Al Spends $100M securing 37 Aircraft. Scale that to the 8,225 Aircraft (http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_11.html http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_stat...) and you'd need a budget of $20 Billion+ without even taking into account that you have a heterogeneous population that doesn't lend itself to easy profiling (unlike israel). The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system. The day a Jewish Terrorist decides to bomb El Al, is the end of the "Interview" system, and the adoption of shoe screening, liquid screening and full body scans. To some degree it's easier just to selectively screen everyone and not even bother with the interview. Just pretend everyone fails it and eliminate that entire step. And, I'll take exception to your statement "Current Methods Aren't working" - How many aircraft per day, or per month, heck _per year_ are being blown out of the American Aviation sky under the current regime? Regarding security theater - Seems to be working for me. "Relying on passengers to fix flaws" - Nobody is allowed to bring on guns, knives, or even large amounts of volatile liquids - the system is designed to allow passengers to subdue any hostiles on the plane. I think that's an excellent part of the current system. "Airport Chaos" - I flew two days after the bombing incident out of YVR to SFO, before _anyone_ really knew what was about to happen next, after most of the restrictions had been put in place, but BEFORE Canada banned (most) Carry On Luggage for US bound flights. So, every single person was having their luggage checked AND being patted down - the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes. But, the most important element to be aware of - the Israel Security systems works based on Racial Profiling - it's that simple. The United States has decided they don't want to go down that path, so, even if the El Al system would scale from 37 to 8,000+ Aircraft, it's not politically tenable.

by kareemm 17y ago

intellectronica 17y ago

My source for Israel is my impressions as someone who grew up in Israel, flew through Tel-Aviv many times (last time this morning) and had quite a few friends who worked in airport security. I think it's quite reliable. My source of the TSA is just my impressions from travelling from the US, so it's probably not that reliable.

ghshephard 17y ago

El Al Spends $100M securing 37 Aircraft. Scale that to the 8,225 Aircraft (http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_11.html http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_stat...) and you'd need a budget of $20 Billion+ without even taking into account that you have a heterogeneous population that doesn't lend itself to easy profiling (unlike israel). The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system. The day a Jewish Terrorist decides to bomb El Al, is the end of the "Interview" system, and the adoption of shoe screening, liquid screening and full body scans. To some degree it's easier just to selectively screen everyone and not even bother with the interview. Just pretend everyone fails it and eliminate that entire step. And, I'll take exception to your statement "Current Methods Aren't working" - How many aircraft per day, or per month, heck _per year_ are being blown out of the American Aviation sky under the current regime? Regarding security theater - Seems to be working for me. "Relying on passengers to fix flaws" - Nobody is allowed to bring on guns, knives, or even large amounts of volatile liquids - the system is designed to allow passengers to subdue any hostiles on the plane. I think that's an excellent part of the current system. "Airport Chaos" - I flew two days after the bombing incident out of YVR to SFO, before _anyone_ really knew what was about to happen next, after most of the restrictions had been put in place, but BEFORE Canada banned (most) Carry On Luggage for US bound flights. So, every single person was having their luggage checked AND being patted down - the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes. But, the most important element to be aware of - the Israel Security systems works based on Racial Profiling - it's that simple. The United States has decided they don't want to go down that path, so, even if the El Al system would scale from 37 to 8,000+ Aircraft, it's not politically tenable.