7 ms·

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security services. It also budgets paying them well. Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society. America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system. 2. Volume - Israel has only one major international airport (and even that one is quite small). As far as airport security is concerned, it is a very local problem which can benefit from focused attention. The US has to protect hundreds of very busy airports, and they all have their unique weaknesses.

andrewcooke 17y ago
one way to fix 1 would be to shift us spending from israel to internal security. 2 isn't clearly an issue; you need to consider something more like the ratio of airport / population.
- intellectronica 17y ago
  It is an issue, because the marginal cost of analysing an Airport for vulnerabilities and devising ways to defend against them doesn't decrease when you cover more airports. You have to Israelificate each and every airport by developing techniques and training a workforce which is not easily transferable.
  - Eliezer 17y ago
    Whaa? R&D on techinques and machinery should have economy of scale, not diseconomy of scale. And the Israelis would be happy to tell us how to do it.
    - intellectronica 17y ago
      If techniques and machinery alone were enough the TSA wouldn't have had any problem. Israel relies on information, design and training specific to Ben-Gurion airport and would have to repeat some of these steps if it ever needed to cover another one.
      - Eliezer 17y ago
        The TSA is run by idiots who didn't ask Israel in the first place.
  - andrewcooke 17y ago
    my point was that if you have more airports you may also be simply a bigger country, with more resources.
    - intellectronica 17y ago
      I don't have the numbers but I'm pretty sure as it is Israel is spending an order of magnitude more per passenger than the TSA does. The fact that the TSA drill is inefficient (and ineffective) doesn't mean that it's expensive.
      - andrewcooke 17y ago
        ok, but that's point 1, which i suspect is getting me voted down. you're replying to me replying to someone questioning point 2.
      - skmurphy 17y ago
        You have to look beyond the direct costs to the costs imposed on travellers and how their reaction impacts the airlines. TSA's current model is expensive for the airlines because it is deterring people from flying. It's expensive for airline travelers because it's adding significantly to the hassle of flying: I believe that many flyers would pay more for the Israeli model if it was at least equally effective because it saves time. I believe that they would pay even more if it was not only less hassle but more effective than the current "security theatre" approach.
Apreche 17y ago
You've hit the nail on the head with #1. The cause of all of our problems is that we have a large population, a large amount of land, and a relatively small proportion of our people are highly skilled and trained experts. Fixing that fundamental issue will solve most of our problems. Israel is a very small amount of land, a relatively small population compared to us, and most of the people are relatively highly trained due to mandatory conscription.
tshtf 17y ago
You're entirely correct on scale. If we take a look at passenger movements for the top 30 airports in the world, available at http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_content07_c.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-5-54-57_666_2__ http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_cont... Ben Gurion airport isn't even listed. The US, Asian, and European airports handling this traffic could not possibly scale to handle this Israeli solution. That said, it may (or may not) be beneficial to find components of the Israeli solution that would work best to handle the issues with manpower and volume.
- encoderer 17y ago
  If, in an alternate reality, Isreal used our current method.. people have to remove their shoes, remove the belts, empty pockets, coats, take out their electronics, have ID's examined twice, etc.. If that was the isreali method, I'd bet my bottom dollar that people would be here saying that such a system wouldn't scale to our busiest airports. It would seem absurd on its face. But, it does scale. Not elegantly. But it does. We're capable of amazing things when there's political will. And I'll tell you this, I fly far more than the average American. And so I chat a lot with other pax. I feel strongly that a headline reading "Airport Security Focus Shifts from baggage to passenger: _Keep your shoes on and answer a few questions_" would be very well received in this country.
- deleted 17y ago
  [deleted]
nir 17y ago
Airport security is indeed considered a good job in Israel, allowing El Al to pick and choose, but not because it is well paid - they probably don't make more than TSA workers. The key is that the job allows employees to be assigned to a station out of the country after a year or so of working TLV. This attracts young people who want to study abroad - it's not uncommon that your El Al screener in JFK would be a grad student at NYU, for example. It also keeps them more motivated, since they see view it as a temporary job rather than a dead end McJob. Of course, in Israel those young students also happen to have 2-3 years' military service behind them, but this isn't that big a deal. It's almost irrelevant for their job (unlike El Al's sky marshals, though, which are another key element)
- intellectronica 17y ago
  I'm pretty sure they do make more than their TSA equivalents. At the very least, an Israeli student working airport security will be making more than her peers who do regular students jobs. Another factor is the prestige that comes with passing the tight selection process and working in the security sector, which is considered possibly the most important aspect of the modern incarnation of Zionism, the national ideological school in Israel. Working in airport security is good on your resume, it will impress your friends and family, it will allow you to think good thing about yourself. I'm almost certain that's not the case for working for the TSA.
  - nir 17y ago
    AFAIK, El Al screeners in NYC make about $30k/year. I suppose they might make more if they do more shifts, do holiday shifts etc. Having a few years as a screener on your resume doesn't hurt, but more because it means you've passed a pretty difficult filtering process and worked a few years in a high-standard and high stress environment than due to any ideology. If the TSA had similar standards, its alumni would probably have similar reputation.
neurotech1 17y ago
I don't think america has a shortage of "trained" security people, there is a fairly large pool of former enlisted military personnel who can be transitioned into airport security. From what I understand, the criminal/terrorist probably would draw suspicion even if approached by relatively untrained airport staff "greeter", and draw further attention to themselves. Remember that the Abdulmutallab came from Yemen, Paid Cash, and had a one-way ticket. Those factors alone, should have warranted further attention during screening, that others would not have recieved because of a benign profile.
- pyre 17y ago
  > there is a fairly large pool of former enlisted military personnel who can be transitioned into airport security. The problem here could be that -- at least in the US -- a lot of military personnel come out of the military with some sort of chip on their shoulder towards the rest of society. Though I could just be exaggerating the issue. If the new security personnel act like 'bullies with a badge' rather than trained professionals, it still might leave air travel as an unpleasant experience.
  - julius_geezer 17y ago
    I don't think the chip on the shoulder exists to the extent that it may once have, partly because those with reservations about US foreign policy have discovered that it is counterproductive to take it out on PFCs. There are undoubtedly a bunch of folks out there with PTSD, and reflexes learned in Baghdad may be honed a little keen for Kansas City.
    - electromagnetic 17y ago
      It must be noted that not all soldiers are in Iraq or Afghanistan, the majority are still based in 'peaceful' areas. Perhaps the soldiers from Baghdad might be tightly wound for airport security, but there's still a large pool of highly trained soldiers who have never stepped into an active war zone. However, from what I was aware the FBI, CIA and several federal agencies in the US tend to get 'first pick' when it came to the ex-military talent. So I wouldn't know if this pool of soldiers is already being tapped to the max.
kareemm 17y ago
while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive. The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc). The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097_puff12.html http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...). Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society. source? America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system. source? --- In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time. El Al security at LAX consisted of: * the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/ http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/), * being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article, * LAX (TSA) security, and * El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly) I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable. There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-numbers_x.htm http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp). The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseID=1041 http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...). Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack. I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out? It sure beats: a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports, b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again [edit: fixed list spacing]
idan 17y ago
Hi, I'm an Israeli who is at least passably familiar with how the security apparatus works here. A few comments on your comments: 1. Scale Scale is an issue, but nobody in the thread has touched on why. The Israeli security model is (as noted in the article) more about the passenger than their baggage. This approach is both effective, time-consuming, and "racist": the profilers have a conversation with each passenger; as I'm an Israeli Jew, I always get the abbreviated treatment -- focusing more on where my bags have been since I've packed them. As a foreigner, you get a much more in-depth grilling. As a Muslim? They want to know your shoe size, and then a whole 'nother screener comes over and asks you everything all over again, just to see that you keep your story straight. Like they say in the article, the conversations they have are not so much about what you say as how you say it. The screeners are taught to iterate a few levels deep into your story and see that it doesn't break down under scrutiny. Naturally, this process supposes that A) the threat is foreign and mostly limited to one ethnic/religious group, and B) screeners have this sort of time. In the US, racial profiling is... unpalatable, and if each passenger / family got even a perfunctory 1-minute Q&A session with a TSA security officer, the system would crash. The US is dealing with a larger threat profile, and a whole different order-of-magnitude of traffic. 2. The security screener's job: manpower, training, history Normally these are intelligent men and women, usually students or twentysomethings, who pass a series of exams and then pass a several-month course. The hours are craptastic but the pay is decent, and a lot of students prefer it to shiftwork or waitressing. Passing the course is difficult but not arduous, and in the end you are really being taught guidelines on interrogation and then set loose to use your judgment -- if you have a red flag to raise, then you just call over a senior screener who has more years of experience. The reality is that there are few enough openings that the program can be selective. I'd say, as a generalization, screeners here possess above-average intelligence, whereas your average TSA screener seems to be a working stiff, blindly following some not-too-complex screening algorithm in a three-ring binder. The number of screeners requisite for staffing all of the US airports precludes the TSA from exclusively employing screeners with the ability to make "judgment calls". There just aren't enough smart people with the desire to work a screener's job in the US. Also of note: screeners here can be idiot asses just like anywhere. I've heard stories from many business colleagues who traveled to Israel on business in the last decade. During the rougher periods of disquiet, they suffered from overzealous screeners who couldn't believe that despite "the situation," there were some businesspeople who had to come here with equipment to demonstrate. Just like the TSA, if a screener decides to make your life unpleasant, it is unpleasant, and there's nothing you can do about it. Past "experience" in the army is completely meaningless for this job. Despite myths about the Israeli army, we are not all super-mossad-spies with extensive training in terrorism and interrogation techniques. Even combat soldiers aren't taught how to perform interrogations; they're taught tactics of battle. The generally security-oriented mindset is fostered at a much younger age with PSA's about unattended bags aimed at schoolchildren. In the end, the system here relies on quality manpower, trained to employ their judgment of whether or not a given person constitutes a risk. In the US, "subjective" is merely a synonym for "pending lawsuit". Amusingly, I don't think the system here would be as compromised by a "procedure document" leak like the recently-infamous TSA docs. Like any good security, it works just as well if you know how it works than if you don't.
siculars 17y ago
Regarding "scale": 1. Manpower is an issue which could be readily addressed by increasing the pay and training of the job. Lets say that manpower is a concern. Well here is a novel idea: don't screen everyone. Screen every 5th, every 4th, etc. Mix up your screening. This alone will send the message that we are gearing up towards using this method. 2. Volume is a red herring. Just replicate what works at one airport by the number of airports we have. Yes it will cost and yes it will be hard to staff but just pay more and increase training. What is the alternative? Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel. Not including the actual cost of losing a plane. To all of those that talk of "profiling" I will ask you to research the Hindawi affair, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindawi_Affair http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindawi_Affair. The bottom line is that profiling is used heavily but nobody gets a free pass. Nobody. I've been flying ElAl for a long time and I always get a through questioning. Fact is is that it doesn't take long for them to establish I am not a threat.
- houseabsolute 17y ago
  > Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel. Why can't we? We survived it before. And I have some bad news for you: it's almost certain we'll have to survive it again some time in the next fifteen to twenty years, if not sooner. Our luck with the missed bombs will not hold out forever. It will be a tragedy. Life will continue (except for those people for whom it does not).

andrewcooke 17y ago

one way to fix 1 would be to shift us spending from israel to internal security. 2 isn't clearly an issue; you need to consider something more like the ratio of airport / population.

intellectronica 17y ago
It is an issue, because the marginal cost of analysing an Airport for vulnerabilities and devising ways to defend against them doesn't decrease when you cover more airports. You have to Israelificate each and every airport by developing techniques and training a workforce which is not easily transferable.
- Eliezer 17y ago
  Whaa? R&D on techinques and machinery should have economy of scale, not diseconomy of scale. And the Israelis would be happy to tell us how to do it.
  - intellectronica 17y ago
    If techniques and machinery alone were enough the TSA wouldn't have had any problem. Israel relies on information, design and training specific to Ben-Gurion airport and would have to repeat some of these steps if it ever needed to cover another one.
    - Eliezer 17y ago
      The TSA is run by idiots who didn't ask Israel in the first place.
- andrewcooke 17y ago
  my point was that if you have more airports you may also be simply a bigger country, with more resources.
  - intellectronica 17y ago
    I don't have the numbers but I'm pretty sure as it is Israel is spending an order of magnitude more per passenger than the TSA does. The fact that the TSA drill is inefficient (and ineffective) doesn't mean that it's expensive.
    - andrewcooke 17y ago
      ok, but that's point 1, which i suspect is getting me voted down. you're replying to me replying to someone questioning point 2.
    - skmurphy 17y ago
      You have to look beyond the direct costs to the costs imposed on travellers and how their reaction impacts the airlines. TSA's current model is expensive for the airlines because it is deterring people from flying. It's expensive for airline travelers because it's adding significantly to the hassle of flying: I believe that many flyers would pay more for the Israeli model if it was at least equally effective because it saves time. I believe that they would pay even more if it was not only less hassle but more effective than the current "security theatre" approach.

Apreche 17y ago

You've hit the nail on the head with #1. The cause of all of our problems is that we have a large population, a large amount of land, and a relatively small proportion of our people are highly skilled and trained experts. Fixing that fundamental issue will solve most of our problems. Israel is a very small amount of land, a relatively small population compared to us, and most of the people are relatively highly trained due to mandatory conscription.

tshtf 17y ago

You're entirely correct on scale. If we take a look at passenger movements for the top 30 airports in the world, available at http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_content07_c.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-5-54-57_666_2__ http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_cont... Ben Gurion airport isn't even listed. The US, Asian, and European airports handling this traffic could not possibly scale to handle this Israeli solution. That said, it may (or may not) be beneficial to find components of the Israeli solution that would work best to handle the issues with manpower and volume.

encoderer 17y ago
If, in an alternate reality, Isreal used our current method.. people have to remove their shoes, remove the belts, empty pockets, coats, take out their electronics, have ID's examined twice, etc.. If that was the isreali method, I'd bet my bottom dollar that people would be here saying that such a system wouldn't scale to our busiest airports. It would seem absurd on its face. But, it does scale. Not elegantly. But it does. We're capable of amazing things when there's political will. And I'll tell you this, I fly far more than the average American. And so I chat a lot with other pax. I feel strongly that a headline reading "Airport Security Focus Shifts from baggage to passenger: _Keep your shoes on and answer a few questions_" would be very well received in this country.
deleted 17y ago
[deleted]

nir 17y ago

Airport security is indeed considered a good job in Israel, allowing El Al to pick and choose, but not because it is well paid - they probably don't make more than TSA workers. The key is that the job allows employees to be assigned to a station out of the country after a year or so of working TLV. This attracts young people who want to study abroad - it's not uncommon that your El Al screener in JFK would be a grad student at NYU, for example. It also keeps them more motivated, since they see view it as a temporary job rather than a dead end McJob. Of course, in Israel those young students also happen to have 2-3 years' military service behind them, but this isn't that big a deal. It's almost irrelevant for their job (unlike El Al's sky marshals, though, which are another key element)

intellectronica 17y ago
I'm pretty sure they do make more than their TSA equivalents. At the very least, an Israeli student working airport security will be making more than her peers who do regular students jobs. Another factor is the prestige that comes with passing the tight selection process and working in the security sector, which is considered possibly the most important aspect of the modern incarnation of Zionism, the national ideological school in Israel. Working in airport security is good on your resume, it will impress your friends and family, it will allow you to think good thing about yourself. I'm almost certain that's not the case for working for the TSA.
- nir 17y ago
  AFAIK, El Al screeners in NYC make about $30k/year. I suppose they might make more if they do more shifts, do holiday shifts etc. Having a few years as a screener on your resume doesn't hurt, but more because it means you've passed a pretty difficult filtering process and worked a few years in a high-standard and high stress environment than due to any ideology. If the TSA had similar standards, its alumni would probably have similar reputation.

neurotech1 17y ago

I don't think america has a shortage of "trained" security people, there is a fairly large pool of former enlisted military personnel who can be transitioned into airport security. From what I understand, the criminal/terrorist probably would draw suspicion even if approached by relatively untrained airport staff "greeter", and draw further attention to themselves. Remember that the Abdulmutallab came from Yemen, Paid Cash, and had a one-way ticket. Those factors alone, should have warranted further attention during screening, that others would not have recieved because of a benign profile.

pyre 17y ago
> there is a fairly large pool of former enlisted military personnel who can be transitioned into airport security. The problem here could be that -- at least in the US -- a lot of military personnel come out of the military with some sort of chip on their shoulder towards the rest of society. Though I could just be exaggerating the issue. If the new security personnel act like 'bullies with a badge' rather than trained professionals, it still might leave air travel as an unpleasant experience.
- julius_geezer 17y ago
  I don't think the chip on the shoulder exists to the extent that it may once have, partly because those with reservations about US foreign policy have discovered that it is counterproductive to take it out on PFCs. There are undoubtedly a bunch of folks out there with PTSD, and reflexes learned in Baghdad may be honed a little keen for Kansas City.
  - electromagnetic 17y ago
    It must be noted that not all soldiers are in Iraq or Afghanistan, the majority are still based in 'peaceful' areas. Perhaps the soldiers from Baghdad might be tightly wound for airport security, but there's still a large pool of highly trained soldiers who have never stepped into an active war zone. However, from what I was aware the FBI, CIA and several federal agencies in the US tend to get 'first pick' when it came to the ex-military talent. So I wouldn't know if this pool of soldiers is already being tapped to the max.

kareemm 17y ago

while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive. The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc). The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097_puff12.html http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...). Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society. source? America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system. source? --- In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time. El Al security at LAX consisted of: * the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/ http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/), * being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article, * LAX (TSA) security, and * El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly) I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable. There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-numbers_x.htm http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp). The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseID=1041 http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...). Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack. I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out? It sure beats: a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports, b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again [edit: fixed list spacing]

idan 17y ago

Hi, I'm an Israeli who is at least passably familiar with how the security apparatus works here. A few comments on your comments: 1. Scale Scale is an issue, but nobody in the thread has touched on why. The Israeli security model is (as noted in the article) more about the passenger than their baggage. This approach is both effective, time-consuming, and "racist": the profilers have a conversation with each passenger; as I'm an Israeli Jew, I always get the abbreviated treatment -- focusing more on where my bags have been since I've packed them. As a foreigner, you get a much more in-depth grilling. As a Muslim? They want to know your shoe size, and then a whole 'nother screener comes over and asks you everything all over again, just to see that you keep your story straight. Like they say in the article, the conversations they have are not so much about what you say as how you say it. The screeners are taught to iterate a few levels deep into your story and see that it doesn't break down under scrutiny. Naturally, this process supposes that A) the threat is foreign and mostly limited to one ethnic/religious group, and B) screeners have this sort of time. In the US, racial profiling is... unpalatable, and if each passenger / family got even a perfunctory 1-minute Q&A session with a TSA security officer, the system would crash. The US is dealing with a larger threat profile, and a whole different order-of-magnitude of traffic. 2. The security screener's job: manpower, training, history Normally these are intelligent men and women, usually students or twentysomethings, who pass a series of exams and then pass a several-month course. The hours are craptastic but the pay is decent, and a lot of students prefer it to shiftwork or waitressing. Passing the course is difficult but not arduous, and in the end you are really being taught guidelines on interrogation and then set loose to use your judgment -- if you have a red flag to raise, then you just call over a senior screener who has more years of experience. The reality is that there are few enough openings that the program can be selective. I'd say, as a generalization, screeners here possess above-average intelligence, whereas your average TSA screener seems to be a working stiff, blindly following some not-too-complex screening algorithm in a three-ring binder. The number of screeners requisite for staffing all of the US airports precludes the TSA from exclusively employing screeners with the ability to make "judgment calls". There just aren't enough smart people with the desire to work a screener's job in the US. Also of note: screeners here can be idiot asses just like anywhere. I've heard stories from many business colleagues who traveled to Israel on business in the last decade. During the rougher periods of disquiet, they suffered from overzealous screeners who couldn't believe that despite "the situation," there were some businesspeople who had to come here with equipment to demonstrate. Just like the TSA, if a screener decides to make your life unpleasant, it is unpleasant, and there's nothing you can do about it. Past "experience" in the army is completely meaningless for this job. Despite myths about the Israeli army, we are not all super-mossad-spies with extensive training in terrorism and interrogation techniques. Even combat soldiers aren't taught how to perform interrogations; they're taught tactics of battle. The generally security-oriented mindset is fostered at a much younger age with PSA's about unattended bags aimed at schoolchildren. In the end, the system here relies on quality manpower, trained to employ their judgment of whether or not a given person constitutes a risk. In the US, "subjective" is merely a synonym for "pending lawsuit". Amusingly, I don't think the system here would be as compromised by a "procedure document" leak like the recently-infamous TSA docs. Like any good security, it works just as well if you know how it works than if you don't.

siculars 17y ago

Regarding "scale": 1. Manpower is an issue which could be readily addressed by increasing the pay and training of the job. Lets say that manpower is a concern. Well here is a novel idea: don't screen everyone. Screen every 5th, every 4th, etc. Mix up your screening. This alone will send the message that we are gearing up towards using this method. 2. Volume is a red herring. Just replicate what works at one airport by the number of airports we have. Yes it will cost and yes it will be hard to staff but just pay more and increase training. What is the alternative? Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel. Not including the actual cost of losing a plane. To all of those that talk of "profiling" I will ask you to research the Hindawi affair, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindawi_Affair http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindawi_Affair. The bottom line is that profiling is used heavily but nobody gets a free pass. Nobody. I've been flying ElAl for a long time and I always get a through questioning. Fact is is that it doesn't take long for them to establish I am not a threat.

houseabsolute 17y ago
> Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel. Why can't we? We survived it before. And I have some bad news for you: it's almost certain we'll have to survive it again some time in the next fifteen to twenty years, if not sooner. Our luck with the missed bombs will not hold out forever. It will be a tragedy. Life will continue (except for those people for whom it does not).