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Couldn't the great chinese firewall just intercept Github.com's HTML page as well and change the subresource integrity hashes? I thought that the Great Chinese

Couldn't the great chinese firewall just intercept Github.com's HTML page as well and change the subresource integrity hashes? I thought that the Great Chinese Firewall already has the ability to penetrate SSL connections via some means.

cddotdotslash 11y ago
They could (assuming that they can infiltrate SSL as you said). I think this is more oriented towards a different attack vector whereby the controller of a resource (JS, CSS, etc.) can alter that resource while the parent page remains unaffected.
abhorrence 11y ago
Yes, however if they can change the contents of the HTML they can probably modify CSP headers, which means they can just deliver whatever payload they want directly and wouldn't need to modify the integrity hashes.
jameshart 11y ago
Yes, though it involves actively processing every request for every page and processing it to replace (or just remove) integrity attributes from the HTML; that's a lot harder than just wholesale replacing the contents of specific JavaScript files on their way across the firewall.
nailer 11y ago
The Great Firewall would probably have copies of private keys issued by CNNIC, and there's a bunch of attacks to get private keys via heartbleed, and a bunch of Debian easily guessable private keys, but there's no general purpose 'penetrate SSL' attack that we know of right now.
- jon-wood 11y ago
  Given control of a certificate authority can the Chinese government issue a new certificate for github.com? I assume they can enforce that computers sold in China have their authority in the default trust list, at which point I think all bets are off when it comes to SSL.
Kronopath 11y ago
The "Great Cannon" attack that they talk about in the blog post wasn't caused by replacing JS in GitHub pages. It replaced a Baidu Analytics script, used across the Chinese internet on thousands of websites, with a malicious one intended to DDOS GitHub from people's home browsers when these websites were accessed outside of China. The way that this fixes the issue is by ensuring that the file being loaded on those thousands of websites is the correct one, and not the malicious attack script that was injected by the Chinese government or other such actors, otherwise it's not run at all. Could the Chinese government rewrite the HTML of all these thousands of websites to also change the hash? Theoretically yes, but practically it makes it much more difficult.

cddotdotslash 11y ago

They could (assuming that they can infiltrate SSL as you said). I think this is more oriented towards a different attack vector whereby the controller of a resource (JS, CSS, etc.) can alter that resource while the parent page remains unaffected.

abhorrence 11y ago

Yes, however if they can change the contents of the HTML they can probably modify CSP headers, which means they can just deliver whatever payload they want directly and wouldn't need to modify the integrity hashes.

jameshart 11y ago

Yes, though it involves actively processing every request for every page and processing it to replace (or just remove) integrity attributes from the HTML; that's a lot harder than just wholesale replacing the contents of specific JavaScript files on their way across the firewall.

nailer 11y ago

The Great Firewall would probably have copies of private keys issued by CNNIC, and there's a bunch of attacks to get private keys via heartbleed, and a bunch of Debian easily guessable private keys, but there's no general purpose 'penetrate SSL' attack that we know of right now.

jon-wood 11y ago
Given control of a certificate authority can the Chinese government issue a new certificate for github.com? I assume they can enforce that computers sold in China have their authority in the default trust list, at which point I think all bets are off when it comes to SSL.

Kronopath 11y ago

The "Great Cannon" attack that they talk about in the blog post wasn't caused by replacing JS in GitHub pages. It replaced a Baidu Analytics script, used across the Chinese internet on thousands of websites, with a malicious one intended to DDOS GitHub from people's home browsers when these websites were accessed outside of China. The way that this fixes the issue is by ensuring that the file being loaded on those thousands of websites is the correct one, and not the malicious attack script that was injected by the Chinese government or other such actors, otherwise it's not run at all. Could the Chinese government rewrite the HTML of all these thousands of websites to also change the hash? Theoretically yes, but practically it makes it much more difficult.