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What I don't understand is how google can be comfortable to use TLS on their SMTP service given that it is vulnerable to a STARTTLS downgrade MITM attack. It's
by cm2187 11y ago
What I don't understand is how google can be comfortable to use TLS on their SMTP service given that it is vulnerable to a STARTTLS downgrade MITM attack. It's like switching from old encryption to optional encryption.
- dadrian 11y agoWhat do you suggest they use instead? No encryption?
- cm2187 11y agoWell, for all of its problems, SSL3 is less trivial to MITM.
- scintill76 11y agoDowngradeable encryption is arguably better than none at all. It raises an attacker's prerequisites from just passive snooping to active tampering. Yeah, it's an illusion of security to an extent, it's imperfect, but between waiting a decade or two for SMTPS delivery to be widespread, and using STARTTLS today, I'll take STARTTLS. T̶h̶e̶y̶ ̶w̶o̶u̶l̶d̶n̶'̶t̶ ̶t̶a̶k̶e̶ ̶a̶ ̶d̶e̶l̶i̶v̶e̶r̶y̶ ̶o̶n̶ ̶p̶o̶r̶t̶ ̶2̶5̶ ̶w̶i̶t̶h̶o̶u̶t̶ ̶S̶T̶A̶R̶T̶T̶L̶S̶.̶.̶.̶ ̶i̶n̶t̶e̶r̶e̶s̶t̶i̶n̶g̶.̶ ̶ ̶D̶o̶e̶s̶ ̶a̶n̶y̶o̶n̶e̶ ̶k̶n̶o̶w̶ ̶i̶f̶ ̶t̶h̶i̶s̶ ̶i̶s̶ ̶u̶n̶i̶v̶e̶r̶s̶a̶l̶?̶ (Edit: may have spoken too soon. smtp.gmail.com responds "530 5.7.0 Must issue a STARTTLS command first." to MAIL FROM, which is I think to force a Gmail user to auth over STARTTLS before sending mail for relaying. The gmail.com MX servers don't appear to force STARTTLS.) Gmail could basically strongarm everyone into using STARTTLS and valid certs, for both sending and receiving, at which point we can release a new RFC requiring immediate STARTTLS or the connection will be closed, and everyone will already be capable of obeying it to be able to interop with Gmail.
- cm2187 11y agoGiven gmail's volume that would pretty much make it a requirement for all other mail services. A mandatory STARSTTLS would make me happy!
- drdaeman 11y agoHow mandatory STARTTLS (on Google servers' side) would help you against MitM downgrade attack? The only way to avoid it is for your MUA to require STARTTLS.
- cm2187 11y agoOr for the server to terminate the connection if STARTTLS is not requested
- drdaeman 11y agoYes, but how that'd prevent the attack? The active attacker may tell your MUA to use the plain text, but this doesn't mean the whole connection must be unencrypted end-to-end. I don't see why the connection past the attacker can't still use STARTTLS (or even "classic" port-based TLS). Google servers won't even know the connection is not secured end-to-end. That said, requiring TLS/STARTTLS on the server side is a good idea. But it doesn't protect from downgrade attacks.
- dchest 11y agoThey also support SMTP over TLS, which isn't vulnerable. Not sure what you mean about switching, perhaps you're confusing terms? TLS != STARTTLS.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- cm2187 11y agoI was under the impression that STARTTLS was the only implementation of SMTP over TLS. If major providers do not respect the STARTTLS protocol and effectively make encryption mandatory that makes me happy. But as far as I know the standard says STARTTLS is optional.
- jlgaddis 11y agoSMTPS (SMTP-over-SSL/TLS) still exists in some places (465/TCP) although it was technically deprecated a long time ago.