I actually agree with much of what is said in this article but I don't see how it amounts to an argument against cryonics. While there's no proof that freezing

I actually agree with much of what is said in this article but I don't see how it amounts to an argument against cryonics. While there's no proof that freezing preserves sufficient information to reconstruct a mind/brain there's also no proof that it doesn't. In fact I don't think there's any proof that cremation doesn't preserve enough information to reconstruct a mind/brain (as far as I know the 2nd law of thermodynamics basically says that the universe as a whole never loses information). Nonetheless it seems obvious that reconstruction from a cryonically preserved brain would be easier/more probable than from a cremated one. As for the question of whether a reconstructed brain would be "you", I'm not sure of that either but here's the way I look at it. I know that "I" occurred once, therefore my existence is mathematically possible. Since I have no reason to think that reality is bounded in space or time (sure this universe might be finite but how do we know another one won't arise in the future ?) it seems reasonable to think that "I" might occur again, since an event of any non-zero probability should occur given infinite time. I don't know how or when this might happen because I don't know what the set of sufficient causal factors for my existence is. Nonetheless it doesn't seem completely unreasonable to think that reconstructing a functional version of my brain that preserves all or most of the information it contained at the moment of my death would have a higher probability of providing those sufficient causal factors as any other event I can easily imagine. Hence I don't see anything inherently irrational about the practice of cryonics for those who would like to increase the probability that their existence will be preserved or recovered after death.